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MARCH, 1949

# The AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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Address all communications concerning *book reviews* to Eva J. Ross, Trinity College, Washington 17, D. C.

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## Some Remarks on The Logic and Grammar of Sociology \*

FRANZ H. MUELLER

THE INTRODUCTION to the treatise on government, commonly known as *De Regimine Principum* which St. Thomas Aquinas wrote around 1267 for the king of Cyprus, contains a passage of special significance for the methodology of the social sciences. There St. Thomas says that the purpose for which he undertook to write this treatise was to expound the origin and functions of government "according to the authority of Holy Writ, the teachings of the philosophers as well as the practice of worthy princes."<sup>1</sup> At first sight, this passage does not appear particularly significant. If we examine it more closely, however, we cannot but recognize that here St. Thomas acknowledges, implicitly at least, three possible approaches to the study of civil society, viz., the theological, the philosophical, and the empirical. In the treatise itself, he does not restrict his inquiries to civil society, but extends them to social life at large, invoking revealed doctrine, natural reason and actual experience as a basis for his arguments. Now, to these three approaches there correspond three sciences of society, viz., social theology, which Father Luigi Sturzo calls sociology of the supernatural, social philosophy sometimes labeled social theory, and empirical sociology or social science in the restricted and proper sense of the word.<sup>2</sup>

What, then, is the formal object, the particular subject matter of each of these sciences?<sup>3</sup> Time permits only a cursory answer. All share, of course, the same material object, the same "raw material," if you will, viz., society and/or social life. Each, however, views it from a different angle, under a specific aspect. Social theology studies the supernatural bases and significance of interhuman life as known to us by revelation and faith. Social philosophy treats of the ultimate causes of society insofar as these can be ascertained by natural reasoning. Sociology, finally, is concerned with the

\* Presidential Address, Dec. 28, 1948

observation and interpretation of those facts which account for the formation and dissolution of social relations and groups.

Social theology presupposes theological anthropology, i.e. that branch of theology which concerns itself with human nature in its integral, fallen, and redeemed state. Thus social theology proceeds from the revealed truth that the end of man is the supernatural possession of God, a partaking of the inner life of the Blessed Trinity, made possible through Christ's work of redemption. Both man's personal and his social nature point towards that very end. As an individual person man is an image of the one God, Who, in the words of the Mass, "so wonderfully gave dignity to his nature and still more wonderfully restored it." As a social being, that is to say, in his relation to his fellow men, man reflects the perfection which the three divine persons communicate to one another. God is indeed the supreme common good and unifying end of human society. Unless seen in the light of the original and supernaturally established solidarity of the human race, the mysteries of original justice and original sin, of incarnation and redemption would seem still farther removed from our comprehension than they already are by their very nature. It should be quite evident that where there are persons there is society, whether it is here on earth or in heaven. We need only think of the Kingdom of God and the mystical body of Christ, of the choirs of angels and the communion of saints to realize at once that there is, really and truly, supernatural society. For the Christian there is no such thing as isolated acts of divine worship. All the sacraments and especially the Eucharistic Sacrifice have a social aspect. We are again becoming aware of this fact to the degree that we shake off the individualistic spell of the past. The sociologist should avail himself of the verities of social theology but he should not entertain the notion that sociological categories can ever unfold the significance of supernatural truth.

As we must not confuse the formal objects of social theology and sociology neither must we obliterate the lines of demarcation between sociology and social philosophy. Yet since both are pursued by the natural light of human reason and since both start out with observation, social philosophy and sociology are relatively more closely related. Social philosophy, however, makes use of experience in a manner different from sociology. It is not interested in the phenomena as such, not even if and insofar as they are typical. Social philosophy, rather, studies the particular case as application

of a universal principle or uses it to abstract a general idea from it. In other words, it is concerned with the generic principles, the nature and essence of social processes, relations and groups, especially with their formal and final causes. Just as social theology is based on a theological anthropology, so is social philosophy based on a philosophical anthropology which is partly identical with rational psychology. One cannot understand the nature of society unless one understands the nature of man as an individual person and a social being. From the knowledge of man's appetites and faculties the social philosopher can draw necessary conclusions as to what man ought to do. The obligations manifested in man's very nature are called the natural law. Insofar as the philosophy of society deals with the natural law it is identical with the corresponding branch of moral philosophy.

I have already stressed the fact that social philosophy is not concerned with the singularity and particularity of social phenomena but with that which they have in common, their general idea. This must not be interpreted to mean that sociology is, in contradistinction to social philosophy, not at all interested in what is general. Every science must, by its very nature, generalize. The general principles of social philosophy are ideal essences, and as such, they are necessary, therefore universally valid. Sociology, however, cannot make the same claim. Sociology does not endeavor nor is it equipped to determine whatness, but is interested, in the first place in observable facts or events appearing or taking place regularly and normally under certain conditions. In other words, its object is the typical rather than the essential. By the "typical" we mean such phenonema as have been observed repeatedly and to which we must, on account of their practically invariable recurrence under the same circumstances, accord a high degree of probability. If the sociologist concerns himself with single cases he does so in order to detect their common characteristics because he has reasons to assume that they are representative of a group, i.e., exhibiting qualities peculiar not only to this or that particular object or process but to a whole group of them. In other words, it is not the sociologist's ultimate concern to reduce social reality to averages or to a few common denominators.

We will come back to this point later. Here we will first try to determine what sociology is. Since this question has been discussed rather amply in our Society ever since its foundation, I beg to be brief. I believe that it is safe to say that sociology concentrates on the material and secondary efficient

causes of society. As you will remember, to ask for the final cause is to ask what a thing is made for; asking for the formal cause is equivalent to asking what distinguishes it from other things; the material cause regards the question what a thing is made of, while the efficient cause regards the agent that made it. The sociologist cannot afford to neglect any of these causes, but he must accept some of them as postulates from social philosophy. The *causa formalis*, which is the principle of specification, and the *finis operis*, the objective intrinsic purpose are beyond the scope of empirical sociology. The sociologist wants to discover that which accounts for the this-ness of a thing, its individuality. While the social philosopher, e.g., determines what is a family or what distinguishes the family as such from the state as such, the sociologist would try to ascertain what accounts for certain typical traits of the American family. He would probably find that this "individuation" must be attributed largely to the "material," that is to say to the type of men, that make up the average American family. He would also become aware of the fact that the *finis operantis*, i.e., the subjective purpose and prevailing motivation has much to do with the *hic et nunc* of the family or any other social group. But he might leave the analysis of the considerations which determine choice to the social psychologist.

The sociologist's main concern are the so-called *causae secundae*, i.e., secondary efficient causes of society. The efficient cause is the principle which produces the innumerable substantial as well as accidental transformations in nature. While the material and formal causes are the intrinsic principles of (material) being, the efficient cause is the extrinsic principle of its becoming. God is, of course, the *causa prima*, the First Efficient Cause of every creature. Although man is only a secondary cause, he is, nevertheless, the first of the secondary causes of association, its principle cause. Some zealous Catholic scholars tend to neglect the secondary causes, referring all becoming directly to the uncreated First Cause, i.e., to the special intervention of God.<sup>4</sup> They seem not to realize that their exaggerated theocentrism and integralism may bring them dangerously close to the basic errors of occasionalism, Calvinism, and Jansenism. St. Thomas has made it perfectly clear that "to detract from the creature's perfection is to detract from the perfection of the divine power," and that "it is derogatory to the divine goodness to deny things their proper operation."<sup>5</sup> In other words, those who pretend to exalt and extol the First Cause by debasing and depreciating the

secondary causes, are really denying the infinite goodness of the Deity which gives not only being to His creatures but allows them also to be causes of their own. This relative causality of created being is the true basis for the ordinate autonomy of the various sciences. The Church, while claiming authority in faith and morals, does not interfere with the relative independence of the various fields of learning and research. "So far" the Vatican Council stated in 1870, "is the Church from opposing the cultivation of human arts and sciences, that it in many ways helps and promotes it. For the Church neither ignores nor despises the benefits to human life which result from the arts and sciences, but confesses that, as they came from God, the Lord of all science, so, if they be rightly used, they lead to God by the help of His grace. Nor does the Church forbid that each of these sciences in its sphere should make use of its own principles and its own method . . ." <sup>6</sup> The Vatican Council actually insists that these sciences do not transgress the lines of demarcation prescribed by their respective formal objects and venture, e.g., into the field of theological truth where they are liable to cause but confusion. It is interesting to know that Pope Pius XI in his encyclical *Quadragesimo anno* uses almost literally the same words of the Vatican Council when formulating the position of the Church regarding her authority in social and economic matters. He states clearly that the Church has not only the right but also the duty to deal authoritatively with social and economic matters if and insofar as these have a bearing on moral conduct. But at the same time the Pope states that the Church does not wish to interpose her authority in technical matters, for which, as the encyclical states, "she has neither the equipment nor the mission." (41) The Pope reminds us of the important fact that distinguishing in mind does not justify divorcing in fact. Since good and being are but different aspects of the same being, ethics and economics must eventually arrive at the same results. Yet, the Pope does not hesitate to state in so many words that "economic science and moral discipline are guided each by its own principles in its own sphere."

What, then, are the principles of sociology or what is its specific sphere? There is probably more danger in an encyclopedic concept of sociology which tends to have overweening ambitions than in a concept which marks sociology off very clearly from other social sciences. It is to be admitted that confusion and unscientific mixing of concepts belonging to different worlds of discourse has been rather rampant among sociologists, Cath-

olics as well as non-Catholics. Yet it is equally true that interest in the epistemological and methodological problems of the social sciences is increasing. It is also gratifying that leading Catholics are among those who define sociology as a special and autonomous science dealing with a circumscribed field of its own. Among them are the French Dominican Father J. T. Delos, the German Dominican Father Eberhard Welty, the Belgian Canon Leclercq, and Father G. Gundlach, S. J., of the Gregorian University in Rome.<sup>7</sup> Many of you know the definition of sociology Father Gustav Gundlach has given, as "that factual and empirical science which has as its formal object the social process of integration whereby men are united to form social structures and which, in particular, studies and classifies the proximate causes of this integrating process." I have seen no better definition and I cannot think of any better. One might argue that a definition of sociology should include reference to the disintegrating processes also. But this is similar to saying that ethics should investigate not only the laws of right conduct but also bad conduct. However, if I have the criterion of good, I have simultaneously the criterion of evil. And when I have a standard or test of association, I have, *per contra*, one of dissociation.

What about the method of sociology? As F. S. C. Northrop has pointed out in his *Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (1947), "in any one science, even when restricted to problems of fact, there are two stages — the natural history stage and the stage of deductively formulated theory — each with its unique scientific methods." (p. 257) Much of contemporary social science, Northrop adds, is in the natural history stage, i.e., in the stage of mere observation, description and classification. As long as a discipline does not go beyond this stage, i.e., as long as it does not develop hypotheses or attempt to interpret the facts, it has not really matured to a science. In other words, the accumulation and even extrapolation of natural history data is not enough. Yet, while it is not enough it is nevertheless indispensable. Which, then, of the scientific methods is especially suited to what has been called the natural history stage of sociology? I believe, the answer must be: the statistical and experimental method. The method best adapted to the stage of deductively formulated theory, however, seems to be the so-called cognitive or interpretative or interpretive method. There should be no doubt that recognition of the relative significance of facts and the discovery of meaning is the primary object of sociological research.

There is no need to give an exhaustive presentation of the statistical and experimental method since most of you are familiar with it. Experimentation is observation under controlled condition. This control may take two forms, that of direct and that of indirect control. Ernest Greenwood has demonstrated the possibilities of indirect control and the advantages to the sociologist of the *ex post facto* experiment developed by F. Stuart Chapin of the University of Minnesota.<sup>8</sup> When experimentation proves, for some reason or other, ineffective with regard to a particular problem statistics may be regarded as the method of choice to obtain control. The statistical method should, of course, be used only where the material in question can be quantified. In order to achieve scientifically valid explanations we need to test causal adequacy by determining the probability of the recurrence of a phenomenon under the same conditions. But, as Max Weber has pointed out, even the highest statistical probability will remain incomprehensible unless the phenomena in question are meaningful. Certain vital processes of population aggregates, e.g., may show high probability rates and yet remain inexplicable from a merely empirical or even human point of view.

It is highly interesting to note that nowadays the simple and implicit faith of scientists in statistics is faltering. Modern statistical tests purport to avoid the confusion to which the intuitive method may lead. But in an important book on the *Theory of Experimental Inference* (1948) Charles West Churchman asks the question: "Has the statistician actually made any advance over the intuitive method? Are we any better off by simply pushing our 'guesswork' back a few steps? . . . What good does it do to define so carefully the criteria of a 'best' method (of testing statistical hypotheses) when such criteria are only valid provided doubtful conditions hold?" (l.c., p. 12)<sup>9</sup>. Churchman insists that the techniques of answering any question in science requires presupposition of efficiency. We must have, he says, criteria of most efficient methods which, in turn, imply a judgement of value. It is too often supposed that the type of statistical test that is to be used can be decided on *a priori* grounds, by mathematical criteria only, while in reality the normal definitions of "best" test set down by the statistician command more or less intuitive agreement. There is no escape from some formal presupposition, Churchman claims. Data alone can never provide a basis for decision; as a matter of fact, the data themselves are presuppositions of a

sort the justification of which is as necessary as that of the formal presuppositions.<sup>10</sup>

Churchman does not imply that the necessity of making certain presuppositions should lead us to discard statistics altogether. He simply wants us to be aware of the fact that no observation can be made without some presupposed theory and that the statistician, when he attempts to set down criteria of "best test" pushes his basic problem considerably beyond the field of formal statistics. As long as we are aware of the limitations of statistics and regard it as a tool rather than as an end in itself it can be used as a valuable substitute for experimental control. I will omit here reference to the problem of probability and social causality, but at least touch upon the possibility of prediction in social life. It is common for Catholics to say that the social sciences can never reach the degree of certainty which the natural sciences enjoy because of the free will of man. But we must not forget that man's freedom does not rule his own being absolutely but within certain limitations. We will not try to defy the law of gravity and step out of the window in order to save ourselves the trouble of walking down the stairs. That is why we can predict, at least for large groups, what will happen on an average in the majority of cases. According to Father August Brunner, S. J., "the closer we approach the boundaries of human freedom, the rarer will become the exception and the more precisely true will be the average, if sufficiently large groups are considered."<sup>11</sup> Max Weber, on the contrary, thinks that the more free a will is the more predictable is the behavior. Free will, he reasons, is active where external pressure or irresistible impulses do not influence a decision. In such a case the individual will manifest behavior which is rationally most adequate for the realization of his purpose. He will follow accepted rules of experience and, therefore, his behavior from a known purpose can be predicted with great, if not absolute certainty.<sup>12</sup> I propose that the problem is not so much one of the power of will as of the fact that men are unable to overcome the mysteries of contingency. All created being is contingent. Things may or may not come to pass for reasons entirely beyond our control. Our own being is not absolute but dependent, subject to the influence of other beings. All the scientist can hope for, both in the realm of nature and of history, is probability.<sup>13</sup>

Yet empirically ascertained conformity is not sufficient for the interpretation of interhuman behavior. I believe we must agree with Max Weber

that even the most exact statistical proof of a high correlation between a given situation and a corresponding action is not enough to understand a social group or a social process. We must also know why it took place at the time and why it should generally follow the same pattern. Only if we can answer this question, can we say that we understand the action. But it is doubtful whether, as Weber believes, this understanding is reached when we succeed in reconstructing the motivation underlying the action. Shall we in our sociological analysis start out from the whole or from the part? Social philosophy tells us that society is an accidental unity, a so-called unity of order, but a true unity nevertheless. This unity is not achieved by piecing together individual motives and actions, but by directing men towards a common good. This philosophical theory of society can be confirmed inductively and empirically. We know from experience that a group is apt to disintegrate, to fall apart, unless the motives and actions of its members harmonize with the objective purpose of the group, unless its members submit to the demands of the supra-individual end of the whole. The sociologist *qua* sociologist cannot and is not expected to tell us anything about the being and nature of society as a whole or of any group in particular. But he must know that he cannot understand the secondary efficient causes of society unless he refers to the group in question and its concrete end. The action of the individuals that build and sustain the group make sense only if viewed as quasi-functions of the whole, similar to the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle which makes sense only if we succeed in reconstructing the whole picture. In other words, we understand social processes and relations by seeing them as manifestations of a more comprehensive unit.<sup>14</sup>

It is by this method that sociology is characterized as a cultural rather than a natural science, a science of "the spirit," as some have called it, rather than a science of irrational substances.<sup>15</sup> The natural scientist stands outside the subject matter of his science, the social scientist stands in the very midst of it. Man, Giombattista Vico said, when he studies the phenomena of nature,, assumes the role of a spectator, when he studies those of civilization and history he is co-actor, he is on the stage, as it were. The sociologist, we might say, does his research work in his own plane of being and is, therefore, able to place occurrences and processes in a context and complex of meaning. But this is true only with regard to human events. Where the sociologist is confronted with facts of physical nature he is, of course, not better off

than the physicist, the chemist or the biologist. No man can understand the behavior of protons or of living cells, or the laws of heredity. We can observe how inherited characteristics are acquired, we can record those processes which have been observed uniformly to happen, we can infer the probability of the processes to recur, etc., but we cannot understand these phenomena in the same sense as we understand the behavior and actions of our fellow men. *Quidquid cognoscitur admodum cognoscentis cognoscitur*, scholastic philosophy tells us. Whatever is known is known according to the capacity of the one who knows. We know God in a human way, by analogy. When we try to understand the things of the infra-human creation from within we are in reality projecting our own mind into these creatures. Thus we reach the things above us as well as those below us only in an inadequate way. But when we turn to our own kind, as in the social sciences, we are closer to home, as it were. We understand the social actions of our fellow men because of the intentionality of interhuman behavior and because of our ability to imaginatively project our own consciousness into them.<sup>15a</sup> Yet understanding, since it is always perspective in character, and somewhat vitiated by the subjective element, is never completely adequate.<sup>16</sup> That is why it is necessary to verify as far as possible our interpretation of the actions of others by experimental and statistical methods. But we must always keep in mind that averages and uniformities, which are the goal of natural science research, can only be tools in the social sciences. Max Weber and other members of the interpretive school are doubtlessly right that the more general a formulation the less it can help the understanding of the significance of social occurrences. There arises the question whether the truth of this statement applies only to the generalizations typical for the natural sciences or also to the *genus proximum — differentia specifica* scheme of philosophy. The philosopher is interested in the species rather than in the individual, in that which the individuals have in common. The social scientist is interested in concrete situations and complex social phenomena; can he be expected to avail himself of the conceptual formulations of philosophy even though these formulations have little bearing on the *hic et nunc* of social life? Can the sociologist attempt to adapt his scheme of concepts to his heuristic needs without becoming victim to the pitfalls of nominalism and without introducing some kind of dualism?<sup>17</sup> I do not propose to answer this question. Whatever the answer may be, there should be no doubt in our mind that the perfection of

sociology as a science is not to be looked for merely in a progressive adaptation of its methodology to that of the natural sciences trying to achieve greater certainty at the cost of greatly lessened significance of its results. But let us be equally wary not to permit a scientific mysticism to invade the field of sociology under the guise of hermeneutics. This double task can be achieved only if we regard sociology as our vocation in the most sublime sense of the word, i.e., as a personal responsibility. It can be achieved only if we convince ourselves of the urgent need for, as well as the long range usefulness of, methodological research and of a well-worked-out set of concepts. In the words of His Excellency Cardinal Stritch in a letter to Father Ralph A. Gallagher, S.J., on the occasion of the first publication of our review: "It is necessary that we avail ourselves of all the authentic findings of modern scholars and add to them if we are going to be true to our apostolate and seek to win to Christ society about us." <sup>18</sup> Yes, we must be ready to take the good things where we can find them, but we must also add to them, do our own share. Having the advantage of a sound philosophical basis we must even aspire to leadership. It is here that we need the assistance and cooperation of our colleagues in the field of philosophy. To them we address the words of the Right Reverend Simon Deploige of the Superior Institute of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Louvain: "Sociology is not a foe of Thomism, but an ally. It is fitting to welcome it, though with discernment; but there is no need to fear or despise it." <sup>19</sup> Let me close with that inspiring appeal to Catholic scientists in the beautiful pastoral letter of His Eminence, Emmanuel Cardinal Suhard of Paris. Your task, the Cardinal says, "is not to follow, but to lead. It is not enough to be disciples, you must become masters; it is not enough to imitate, you must be creative. Your research must bear first in pure truth and disinterested science. You must pursue truth for itself without however ignoring its application. You must penetrate more and deeply the secrets of nature whose enigma is a constant appeal to seek higher, even to God Himself. You must integrate the conclusions of your several fields of specialization in order to try and form a cosmic vision of the universe. In this effort you must not involve any consideration of interest be it even apologetical; you must seek only what is. Your loyalty will be equalled only by your openmindedness and your effective cooperation with all those, believer and unbelievers, who pursue the true 'with all their soul.' You will not hesitate to give yourself entirely and in the 'you

of knowing' to your 'vocation of scholars.' . . . The whole body of your accumulated works should be employed in (this) gigantic synthesis of the world to come. Do not be timid. Rather defend, exact, and impose in the name of science where no one should equal you, your masterly and liberating conception of the world and of man."<sup>20</sup>

College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minn.

1. St. Thomas Aquinas, *On the Governance of Rulers*, New York, 1943, p. 29.
2. Cf. Sturzo, Luigi, *The True Life*, Washington, D. C., 1943; Furfey, Paul H., *Three Theories of Society*, New York, 1937.
3. Cf. Mueller, Franz H., "The Formal Object of Sociology," *The Amer. Cath. Sociol. Review*, vol. 1, No. 2, p. 55-61.
4. Cf. *Theological Studies*, vol. VI, No. 2, p. 298.
5. *De Ver.*, 9. 5, a. 8c.
6. Cf. Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, No. 1799.
7. Cf. Delos, J. T. O. P., *L'objet de la Sociologie*, *La vie intellectuelle*, III, 7, pp. 264-287; Welty, Eberhard, O. P., *Gemeinschaft und Einzelmensch*, Salzburg, 1934, p. 32; Gundlach, Gustav, S. J., *Gregorianum*, vol. XVII, p. 294.
8. Cf. Greenwood, Ernest, *Experimental Sociology*, New York, 1945.
9. Cf. also, Furfey, Paul H., *A History of Social Thought*, New York, 1946, p. 368.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 282, 285, etc.
11. Brunner, August, S. J., *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy*, St. Louis, Mo., 1937, p. 131.
12. Abel, Theodore, *Systematic Sociology in Germany*, Columbia University Studies in History, etc., vol. 310, New York, 1929 (chapter on Max Weber).
13. Simon, Tres, *Nature and Functions of Authority*, Milwaukee, 1940, pp. 24-32.
14. Gundlach, Gustave, S. J., *Zur Soziologie der Katholischen Ideenwelt und des Jesuitenordens*, Freiberg, i. B., 1927, pp. 7-8, 15, 24 (footnote), etc.
15. When in 1849 J. Schiel rendered J. S. Mill's *Logic* into German, he translated "moral science" with *Geisteswissenschaft*. But ever since Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, Weber, Sombert and others availed themselves of this new term, it has assumed a new meaning which makes a re-translation into English impossible. The South-West German School of Philosophy called those of the *Geisteswissenschaften* which deal with historical phenomena "*Kulturwissenschaften*" or sciences of civilization. There seems to be no objection to translate this term with "social sciences" provided one keeps in mind that the *Kulturwissenschaften* are clearly distinguished from the natural sciences. The social sciences may thus not abstract from time and space. The natural science approach to social phenomena aiming at the development of "timeless," abstract, laboratory-type concepts is out of the question for the *Kulturwissenschaften*. Cf. also Mayer, J., *Social Science Principles in the Light of Scientific Method*, Durham, N. C., 1941, p. 31.
- 15a. Cf. House, F. N., *The Development of Sociology*, New York, 1936, pp. 393-402; Barnes, H. M., and Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, vol. I, New York, 1938, pp. 892-895; Weber, Max, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, New York, 1947, pp. 87-89; *The Social Sciences* (a report), London, 1936, p. 175; Gerth, H. H. and Mills, Wright, *From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology*, New York, 1946, p. 56; Barnes, H. E. Becker, H., and Becker, F. B., ed., *Contemporary Social Theory*, New York, 1940, pp. 93-109; Ginsberg, M., *Sociology*, London, 1937, pp. 10-12; Parsons, T., *The Structure of Social Action*, New York, 1937, pp. 586-610; Bernard, L. L., ed., *The Fields and Methods of Sociology*, New York, 1934, pp. 24-31; *Deutscher Soziologentag 1928, Schriften der Dt. Gesellschaft für Sociologie*, Tübingen, 1929, pp. 208-247.
16. Brunner, S. J., loc. cit., p. 193-194.

- 17 Cf. Winter, E. K., *Die Sozialmetaphysik der Scholastik*, Vienna, 1929, pp. 40-49.
- 18 Cf. Amer. Cath. Sociol. Review, vol. I, No. 3, p. 115.
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## Catholic Education as a Factor in Catholic Opinion \*

THOMAS C. HARTE, C. Ss. R.

**A**PPROXIMATELY one year ago a research committee was organized within the Department of Sociology at The Catholic University of America to undertake a series of opinion studies among Catholics of the United States. Through the encouragement and generous cooperation of Catholic sociologists in sixteen institutions the first survey of Catholic opinion undertaken by the committee has been successfully completed. This paper will attempt a description and brief analysis of the data gathered through Survey I on a single point, viz., the relationship between formal Catholic education and the opinions of Catholic respondents included in the survey.

Before proceeding to a discussion of this question, however, some preliminary remarks are necessary on the broad purposes and special instruments employed.<sup>1</sup> Then the sample from which these data has been drawn, and the findings on the responses and on the reasons given, will be discussed.

### 1. PURPOSES AND TECHNIQUES OF SURVEY I

The general objectives underlying the present interest in Catholic opinion can be stated in question form. How do Catholics think on the so-called "questions of the day"? And, more importantly, what are the significant factors in formation of Catholic opinion? Mr. Gallup and his fellow-pollsters, Mr. Roper and Mr. Crosby, can usually supply an adequate answer to the first question, at least on the more important current issues. They pointed, for example, to Catholic conformity with or deviation from the general opinion on such questions as the entrance of the United States into World War II,

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1. For a more detailed discussion of these points see publication R-1 of the committee, "Toward a Catholic Opinion Study; Preliminary Report on Survey I" (Mimeographed; December, 1948).

and the probable choice of Catholic voters in national elections. It should be evident to anyone who has followed the poll findings closely that the opinions of Catholics, in so far as they vary from the general opinion, can often be explained by factors other than religious doctrines or beliefs. This conclusion suggests a more pertinent question: does the opinion of Catholics on current national or international problems reflect the teachings of the Church? We are all aware of the fact that the Church advances a moral system which has definite application in many areas of human affairs. For example, there are moral principles which apply to the question of war and its related problems, to divorce, to released-time in public schools, and to many aspects of the race problem. Every Catholic educator and leader must ask himself from time to time just how effectively the doctrines he teaches are applied beyond the doors of the Church, the lecture hall, or classroom. This first survey attempts, in a modest way, to supply some tentative answers to this question in the field of public opinion. The precise formulation of the question which Survey I set out to answer was as follows: do Catholics advert to Catholic principles in forming their opinions on current questions?

The particular instrument chosen for this study was the opinion poll. After some discussion and experimentation, three "morally-charged" issues, i.e., questions with moral implications, were selected for the first poll. These were: the manufacture and use of the atom bomb, the obligations of Americans towards displaced persons, and the problem of euthanasia. The schedule finally adopted contained four questions on the atom bomb, five questions on displaced persons, and four questions on euthanasia. There was, in addition, a list of twenty items of personal data which respondents were expected to supply.

The type of question employed on the poll was a combination of the categorical and the open-ended or free-answer question. For example, the respondent was asked in reference to the atom bomb: Do you think the United States should have used the atom bomb against Japan? He was requested to register a "yes" or "no" response to the question, and then to give a reason for his answer in a space allotted for that purpose.<sup>2</sup> On questions pertaining to the atom bomb and to displaced persons, it was not expected, for obvious reasons, that the responses alone would reveal much about the ad-

2. For convenience, in this paper, the first part of the answer, i.e., the "yes" and "no" section, is designated as the "response"; the explanation of the answer is referred to as the "reason."

vertence of respondents to moral principles. It would be grossly dishonest to say that there is a defined "Catholic position" on each of the questions used on these two issues. Even in Series 3, on the subject of euthanasia, although the questions were so arranged that a "no" response was the only correct answer on each question, the response was not, in itself, an infallible index to the moral consciousness of the respondent.<sup>3</sup> A respondent could, and sometimes did, check the "yes" responses, and explain his position by a correct moral principal. In such a case, although his answer is totally incorrect, there is a clear advertence to some form of morality.

In view of the professed purposes of the study, and of the difficulties involved in interpreting responses by themselves, it was necessary to rely, in great part, on the reasons given by respondents for their answers. It was assumed that if the respondent was conscious of the application of some moral law or teaching of the Church, he might indicate this awareness on some question within each series. There are, therefore, two distinct problems involved in the use of the responses and the reasons as data: there is first of all the problem of advertence to moral principles — i.e., did respondents see the issue as moral or religious in character; and secondly, the problem of correct knowledge of principles and their correct application. The discussion here is about advertence to moral principles, and not about the moral correctness or incorrectness of opinions, unless otherwise indicated.

In order to measure the degree of advertence or non-advertence to moral principles a special scale was devised.<sup>4</sup> There are seven points on this "moral awareness" scale, arranged on continuum from zero to six. A statement indicating clearly that the respondent adverted to the morality of a specific question was given a rating of six; on the other hand, a statement which clearly excluded moral principles from a judgment on the same question was rated zero. When the statement was of such a character as to permit no judgment of advertence or non-advertence to moral and religious principles, a rating of three was assigned. Ratings between zero and three indicate presumed lack of advertence, between three and six presumed advertence.

3. The term "series" describes the questions grouped under each major topic. Thus, the four questions on the atom bomb constitute Series 1, the five on displaced persons Series 2, and the four on euthanasia Series 3.

4. This is described in Publication R-2, "The Rating of Advertence to Moral and Religious Implications of Social Issues Presented in an Opinion Survey (Mimeographed: December, 1948).

The higher the rating of a respondent on a question, therefore the more explicit was his advertence to moral and religious standards in stating his opinion.

## II. COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE

With this basic information in mind, it is now possible to return to the particular subject of discussion — formal Catholic education as a factor in the opinions of Catholics. Although there were 2370 completed schedules returned on Survey I, it was physically impossible to tabulate all the returns in preparation for this paper. Of the total number, 533 were selected, representing fourteen different groups.. No claim can be made that this is either an adequate or a representative sample of the total Catholic population. In order to make this sample as representative as possible, however, twelve non-student groups were selected, that is, groups whose members were not attending Catholic schools at the time the survey was made. These twelve groups constituted the total non-student population represented in Survey I. The remaining returns were all from student universes. To round out the sample one group of students from a Catholic men's college and one group from a Catholic women's college were selected at random for inclusion. Table 1 gives a more complete breakdown of the sample by constituent groups.

Table 1  
COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE BY GROUPS REPRESENTED  
AND BY SIZE OF GROUPS

No. of Groups	Group Types	No. of Respondents
2	Newman Clubs in state colleges	29
2	Catholic college alumnae	87
1	Holy Name Leaders	52
1	Catholic Social Club	55
1	Catholic Women's Club	30
1	Parish leaders	39
1	Knights of Columbus	79
1	College Mother's Club	42
1	Ladies of Charity	23
1	Negro youth group	21
1	Catholic women's college students	29
1	Catholic men's college students	67

No attempt was made to control the sex factor in selecting the sample. It is interesting to note, therefore, that there is an almost equal division of the sexes in the total sample (Table 2).

Table 2

COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE BY SEX AND BY LEVELS  
OF CATHOLIC SCHOOLING

Levels of Catholic Schooling	Males	Females	Total
Some Catholic college	96	123	219
Some Catholic high school	79	72	151
Some Catholic grade-school	46	44	90
No Catholic schooling	60	33	93
Totals	282	272	553

The college and high school groups are certainly over-represented in proportion to the total Catholic population in these categories, yet it must be emphasized that it would not now be possible to design a specific sample of the whole Catholic population. This paper merely attempts to describe some of the data obtained through the cooperation of Catholic sociologists in various sections of the country. Since most cooperators used Survey I on their own colleges classes, it is safe to say that the Catholic grade school and the no-Catholic-schooling groups are, in fact, over-represented in this sample in proportion to the total returns.

The proportion of respondents with some college education is still higher if general schooling (exclusively Catholic; partially Catholic; or not Catholic) is considered. Fifty per cent of the men and women who filled out schedules have had some college education, while a mere eight per cent have had only a grade school education (Table 3).

Table 3

COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE BY SEX AND  
GENERAL SCHOOLING

Levels of General Schooling	Males	Females	Total	of total
Some graduate	8	18	26	4.7
Some college	153	134	287	52.0
Some high school	95	100	195	35.2
Some grade school	25	20	45	8.1
Totals	281	272	553	100.0

An analysis of the age distribution of respondents shows that forty-six per cent of the total is grouped within the 20-29 age period, while thirty-nine per cent is distributed over the 30-59 age period (Table 4.).

Geographically, the sample represents six different states. Four groups are from Michigan; three each from Pennsylvania and Tennessee; two from Ohio; one each from Minnesota and Missouri. As regards racial composition, there are only twenty-one Negroes, the remainder (532) being white.

**Table 4**  
**COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE BY AGE AND SEX**

Age Periods	Males	Females	Totals	Per cent of Total
10-19	23	38	61	11.1
20-29	147	104	251	45.8
30-39	44	24	68	12.4
40-49	35	38	73	13.5
50-59	27	46	73	13.5
60-69	7	13	20	3.6
70-79		2	2	.1
Totals	283	265	548	100.0

### III. The Responses

The point has been made above that very little can be hoped for, by way of interpreting the moral advertence of respondents from a tabulation of responses alone on Series 1 and 2. The responses are interesting in themselves, however, in that they shed some light on the comparative reaction of respondents with different backgrounds of Catholic education to the same problems.

For the present, only one type of response will be considered in each series. On the questions pertaining to the atom bomb, the "no" response will be discussed (Table 5), although the "yes" and "no opinion" responses would be equally satisfactory. The most noteworthy fact about this group of data is that there is comparatively little opposition to the past or future use of the atom bomb. The highest proportion of "no" responses came on question three, but even in this case the proportion was lower than might

Table 5

## PERCENTAGE OF "NO" RESPONSES FOR TOTAL GROUP AND FOR SPECIFIC EDUCATIONAL CATEGORIES BY ITEMS ON SERIES I

Questions	Total Group	Catholic college	Some Catholic high school	Some Catholic grade school	No Catholic schooling
1. Do you think that the United States should have used the atom bomb against Japan? .....	25.4	29.2	22.7	21.3	24.8
2. Do you think that we should continue to manufacture the atom bomb? .....	15.9	16.8	13.3	20.0	13.9
3. In the event of another war do you think that we should use the atom bomb even if the enemy does not use it against us? .....	41.0	43.7	37.3	41.1	39.8
4. If the enemy should use the atom bomb against us, should we then use it? .....	5.3	6.9	4.7	3.4	4.4

have been expected. A second interesting point is that the differences in response for the various levels of Catholic education are relatively insignificant. It is true that the Catholic college group has a higher than average proportion of "no" responses on all questions save the second. However, since the differences in every instance are small, and since no pattern of response is discernible for the other groups, no legitimate inference is possible.

The "yes" response was analyzed for questions pertaining to the displaced persons issue (Table 6). The most striking point on this series is the contrast between agreement upon a general principle and disagreement upon proposed means of implementation. A very high proportion of the respondents are of the opinion that Americans have some obligation towards needy non-Americans. However, there is a significant decline in the proportion of "yes" responses on question six, which proposed a more liberal policy in the admission of displaced persons into the United States. Almost half of those respondents who recognized some general obligations towards displaced persons were unwilling to have more of them admitted to the United

Table 6

PERCENTAGE OF "YES" RESPONSES FOR TOTAL GROUP AND FOR  
SPECIFIC EDUCATIONAL CATEGORIES BY ITEMS ON SERIES II

Questions	Total Group	Some Catholic College	Some Catholic High School	Some Catholic Grade School	No Catholic College
5. Do you think that the United States has any obligation towards the needy persons in other parts of the world? .....	88.0	95.0	83.9	83.1	83.2
6. Do you think that the United States should admit more displaced persons from Europe than it does at the present time? .....	49.0	62.5	38.0	41.1	43.3
7. Do you think that the United States should admit more displaced persons from China than it does at the present time? .....	26.1	33.8	20.1	21.8	20.9
8. Would you want to see some of these displaced persons settle down in your community? .....	56.7	66.0	47.6	55.0	51.6
9. Would you actively assist displaced persons to establish themselves in your community? .....	65.0	69.8	62.3	61.1	62.1

States. The question of admitting displaced persons from China produced a further decline in "yes" responses. Of those who recognized the general obligation, only about thirty per cent were of the opinion that more Chinese should be admitted. This question provoked, definitely, the low point in affirmative responses on the series. The proportion of "yes" responses increases on question eight, which raises the issue of displaced persons settling down in the respondent's own community. The upward trend continues on question nine, which places the whole issue on a personal basis. Many who were opposed to other proposals along the line would do what they could to

help if displaced persons actually came to their home communities. Therefore, although the majority of all groups admitted some general obligation towards needy people in other parts of the world, this did not imply, for many of the respondents, a more liberal immigration policy to meet post war emergency conditions. The opposition to such a policy was particularly pronounced with regard to Chinese displaced persons. Once the issue was placed on a community and personal basis, however, there was consistent evidence of a more tolerant attitude.<sup>5</sup>

Turning now to group differentials on the basis of Catholic educational background, we find that those with some Catholic college education tend to stand apart from the other groups. On every question, this group ranks from four to thirteen percentage points above the average. It is true that it follows the general trend of all groups in this series, but it is safely separated on every question from the group below it. It might be expected that those with some Catholic high school education would follow closely after the college group in favorable responses. This is not the case. They are closest to them on the question of general obligation and on rendering personal service to displaced persons; but they score lowest of all groups on the questions in between. Those with some Catholic grade school are the most unpredictable in this series as in the preceding. Sometimes they rank second, next to the college group; and sometimes they rank lowest of all groups. The safest conclusion is that the group with some Catholic college education is the only one that seems to follow a definite pattern.

How shall we designate the differential that exists between respondents with some Catholic college education and those without it? Shall we say the former tend to advert more frequently to the moral issues involved than their fellow-respondents? This might be an interesting hypothesis, but the data available on the reasons given for the responses do not bear this out. Perhaps it might be safer to say, and more in keeping with the facts, that the man with some Catholic college education is more tolerant generally than his less educated Catholic brother. He is more something or other. And perhaps "tolerant" describes that something as well as any other word.

5. This confirms previous evidence that personalizing the issue produces a definite effect. See Hadley Cantril, *Gauging Public Opinion* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1947), pp. 46-48. In this instance, one must hesitate to posit the cause of the effect. Conceivably, it might be the recognition of an obligation, on the one hand, or simply a desire to protect the ego, on the other.

Series 3, on the subject of euthanasia, was so organized that the only correct answer from the moral point of view was a "no" response. Consequently, the data on this series will be discussed in terms of the "no" response (Table 7). On this series the expected pattern shows up most clearly. The highest negative response for the whole sample on this problem, and for the various groups within the sample, was achieved on the first question. As the questions became more complex, because of the addition of new conditions, there is a noticeable decrease in the proportion of "no" responses. Taking the group as a whole, then, the highest proportion of "no" responses is found on the first question; although even here twelve per cent of the total respondents checked either "no opinion" or "yes" responses. The lowest proportion of "no" answers is found on the thirteenth question, in which an average of eighteen per cent of the respondents missed the morally-correct answer.

Table 7  
PERCENTAGE OF "NO" RESPONSES FOR TOTAL GROUP AND FOR  
SPECIFIC EDUCATIONAL CATEGORIES BY ITEMS ON SERIES III.

Questions	Total Group	Some Catholic college	Some Catholic High School	Some Catholic Grade School	No Catholic Schooling
10. Many people believe that doctors should be allowed to administer fatal drugs to people suffering from incurable diseases. Do you believe doctors should be allowed to do this?	88.8	95.8	90.0	83.1	76.3
11. In the event your state passed a law making this practice legal do you think it would be all right for doctors to do this?	85.5	95.0	83.9	77.7	72.8
12. Do you think it would be all right in very extreme cases of suffering?	83.0	93.5	85.2	75.0	63.2
13. In the event a patient and his relatives agreed to it would a doctor then be allowed to administer these fatal drugs?	82.0	95.0	79.7	79.3	59.6

A breakdown by levels of Catholic education shows some significant results. The group with some Catholic college education is well above the average on every question, although from five to seven per cent of the group gave other than "no" responses. The group with some Catholic high school education at las conforms to expectations, placing second to the college group. on every question. The range for this group is from eighty to ninety-one per cent "no" responses, and there is, at best, a considerable gap between this and the range for the college group. Next in order comes the group with some Catholic grade school education, and although it ranks considerably lower than the high school group, it still has a comfortable margin over those with no Catholic education. Seventy-six per cent of this last group answered negatively on the first question, but only fifty-nine per cent on the last question.

If we keep in mind that a "no" response in this series is equivalent to a correct answer, from the moral point of view, the total picture is not quite as encouraging as it appears to be at first. In view of the prominence given this doctrine by the Church in America, it is rather surprising that so many Catholics, on all levels of Catholic education, are either doubtful about the morally correct position on euthanasia, ignorant of it, or positively opposed to it.

What has been said so far about Catholic education as a factor in Catholic opinion, on the basis of the responses given each question, can be briefly summarized as follows. On questions concerning the atom bomb and its use, there is no apparent relationship between Catholic college background, just as the man with no Catholic education, is generally inclined to favor its use. On questions referring to displaced persons, there is a consistent and significant difference between the reactions of those with some Catholic college education and those without. The former, those with a Catholic college background, can be designated, on the basis of these data, as being more "tolerant" than the remainder of the sample. In regard to questions on euthanasia, while it may be difficult to say, on the basis of responses alone, that one educational group is superior to others in adverting to moral principles, it can be concluded legitimately that the college group places highest in the correctness of its responses, and the other groups fall into line in the expected order.

#### IV. THE REASONS

The technique employed in evaluating the "your reason" part of the poll has been explained above. Each answer was assigned a specific rating, rang-

ing from zero to six, depending upon the degree of moral awareness manifested. A total rating was obtained for each schedule by adding the ratings on each of the thirteen questions. The lowest rating obtainable under this system was zero, and the highest seventy-eight. Table 8 shows the distribution of total ratings for each level of Catholic education.<sup>6</sup>

Table 8  
MEAN TOTAL RATINGS FOR THE WHOLE SAMPLE  
BY CATHOLIC SCHOOLING

Level of Catholic Schooling	Number	Mean Total Rating
Some college	219	55.0
Some high school	151	48.4
Some grade school	90	45.5
No Catholic schooling	93	44.3
Total	553	50.8

Those with some Catholic college education placed highest in the ratings of "moral awareness," although their mean total rating was twenty-three points below the maximum obtainable. Those with some Catholic high school education placed second highest, followed by those with some Catholic grade school, and, in last place, by those with no Catholic schooling. Between the highest group and the lowest, there is a difference of ten points in mean total rating. Several points separate the various educational levels, with the exception of a one-point interval between those with Catholic grade school and those with no Catholic education. It is somewhat surprising that the inter-group intervals are not larger, but they are sufficiently large, and the pattern is clear enough, to be significant. On the basis of these mean total ratings there seems to be a correlation between formal Catholic education and advertence to moral principles. The higher the level of Catholic education, the stronger the indication from the reasons given that respondents form their opinions in terms of religion and morality.

However, the above conclusion is based on total ratings. The question still remains: does the Catholic college group score consistently higher

6. The original tabulations were not made by levels of Catholic education. Each schedule was rated in the order in which it occurred in the group in which it was received. Most groups, e. g., Mother's Club, Knights of Columbus, included representatives of all levels of Catholic education.

throughout, or merely on one type of question? The mean total rating for each level of Catholic education can tell us little on this point. It was indicated previously that there is only ten points difference between the means for the lowest and highest levels of Catholic education. Any one series of questions could readily account for this difference.

From a careful inspection of the tabulations, it was evident that no significant differences in mean group ratings would be found in questions pertaining to the atom bomb. The general tendency of all groups, regardless of Catholic educational background, was to rate quite low on this Series. On the other hand, there seemed to be a reasonable assumption that some of the variation in mean total ratings resulted from on Series 2, on displaced persons. An examination of 330 schedules (out of 553) revealed no significant differences, however. All the evidence seemed to point to Series 3 as the principal source of differences in total scores.

To verify this conclusion a sub-sample of 188 schedules was selected on the basis of Catholic educational background.<sup>7</sup> A classification of these data left no room for further doubt. Differences in total scores were easily accounted for in Series 3 (Table 9).

Table 9  
MEAN RATINGS OF A SUB-SAMPLE ON SERIES  
III BY CATHOLIC SCHOOLING

Levels of Catholic Schooling	Number	Mean Rating
Some college	61	23.4
Some high school	47	21.1
Some grade school	39	16.3
No Catholic schooling	41	15.8
Total	188	19.7

On the basis of this evidence there is not other conclusion but that the advertence of all Catholic educational groups is practically equal on the atom

7. The sub-sample included seven different groups: Knights of Columbus (10); parish leaders (12); students of a Catholic women's college (29); college alumnae (21); Holy Name leaders (53); Women's Club (19); Catholic Social Club (44). These groups were selected at random from the larger sample.

bomb and displaced persons issues. Respondents with a Catholic college background are apparently not superior to those with no Catholic education in forming their opinions in terms of moral principals and religious teachings. The seemingly greater moral advertence of respondents with some Catholic college education was, in fact, a greater advertence merely on questions pertaining to euthanasia.

Although this paper does not attempt to analyze the sex factor in Catholic opinion, it might be of interest to call attention to a simple breakdown, by sex and education, of the sub-sample used previously.

Table 10  
MEAN RATINGS OF SUB-SAMPLE ON SERIES III BY SEX AND  
LEVEL OF CATHOLIC SCHOOLING

Levels of Catholic Schooling	Males		Females	
	Number	Mean Rating	Number	Mean Rating
Some college	10	21.6	50	23.8
Some high school	34	20.4	13	20.8
Some grade school	20	15.7	17	18.6
No Catholic schooling	22	14.9	19	14.6

On the subject of euthanasia, therefore, female respondents rated slightly higher than the males on all levels of Catholic schooling. For the group with no Catholic education, the ratings of men and women are practically equal. It is worth noting that even though men with a Catholic college background rated two points lower than women with the same background, they (the men) are, nevertheless, still approximately one point higher than the average rating of the group with some Catholic high school education.

There is one more point to be considered. Thus far no attempt has been made to correlate moral advertence and the different levels of general schooling, i.e., total education whether Catholic or not Catholic. Might it not be reasonable to expect that there is a positive relationship between general education and moral consciousness on public issues? Although the number of respondents who have had no Catholic schooling is not comparable to those who have this background, a breakdown of the available data on this basis yields some suggestive results (Table 1.)

Table 11

**TOTAL MEAN RATINGS BY EDUCATIONAL LEVELS FOR  
RESPONDENTS WITH AND WITHOUT CATHOLIC SCHOOLING**

Level of schooling	Without Catholic Schooling		With Catholic Schooling	
	No.	Mean Rating	No.	Mean Rating
Some college	29	45.6	219	55.0
Some high school	46	43.8	151	48.4
Some grade school	18	43.5	90	45.5
Totals	93	44.3	460	50.8

On the average, the man or woman with only a high school education outside of Catholic schools fared no better in adverting to the morality of the questions proposed than one with a grade school education. A slight but significant improvement is characteristic of the group with some college education, but nothing quite comparable to a similar Catholic education. The average respondent with some college, but no Catholic education, seemed to be about as conscious of the moral implications in the poll questions as the average respondent with some Catholic grade school education. The differences in ratings between these two groups, i.e., those with and those without a Catholic education, is not so remarkable when it is recalled that the problem of euthanasia was the most important differentiating issue. If the series of questions on that subject were eliminated, differences in ratings by educational levels would be insignificant.

### Summary

Returning once more to the stated problem of this paper, it is now possible to offer certain tentative conclusions with reference to formal Catholic education as a factor in Catholic opinion.

(1) On the subject of euthanasia the respondents tended to apply moral and religious values in forming their opinions in direct proportion to the amount of formal Catholic education they received.

(2) On questions pertaining to the atom bomb and displaced persons, no evidence was uncovered which would indicate any significant correlation between Catholic education and the moral awareness of respondents. Al-

though the Catholic college group registered a high degree of tolerance on the subject of displaced persons, there was no clear indication that this attitude was related to a consciousness of the moral issues involved.

(3) The preceding conclusion suggest the hypothesis that the higher ratings of advertence to principles on euthanasia reflect formal classroom instruction on this subject. On the other hand, the low ratings on this subject, as on the atom bomb and displaced persons issues, may be related to the absence of such formal instruction. There is not sufficient evidence to conclude that respondents formed their opinions in the light of moral principles only on subjects in which they had been formally indoctrinated, but this hypothesis is sufficiently well founded to deserve further investigation. The inclusion of both types of problems (i.e., subjects in which there has been and has not been formal instruction) in future surveys seems indicated.

(4) Women rated slightly higher than men on questions referring to euthanasia. The sex factor did not seem as important as Catholic education as an influence on the ratings; however, this whole question demands separate analysis.

(5) Although significant differences in ratings were discovered corresponding to the levels of Catholic schooling, no comparable variations could be found for the levels of general schooling outside Catholic institutions. It is suggested that the explanation for this is the lack of formal instruction regarding the issues on all levels of general education.

A great deal of caution needs to be exercised in interpreting and applying the findings of this survey. Since the study is based upon a limited sample of the Catholic population, there is no basis for the assumption that its conclusions are applicable in all related areas. Furthermore, while it is clear from the results obtained that there is a relationship between formal Catholic education and advertence to moral principles, in one area at least, it is by no means clear that Catholic education is the only, or, indeed, the most important factor. To evaluate all the factors properly, much more serious study and research is needed.

The Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D. C.

## Canon Jacques Leclercq as Sociologist

EVA J. ROSS

UNTIL 1948, only those who knew the development of sociological teaching at the University of Louvain would have thought of sociology in connection with Canon Leclercq. To the general public he has been known as a writer on spiritual topics, on Catholic Action, and on social philosophy, but not as a sociologist. Now, however, the situation is somewhat different.

Since some readers may not be familiar with the work of Canon Leclercq, it will be useful to give a few details concerning his career. He was born in Brussels on June 3, 1891. Unlike most Belgians, his parents were not Roman Catholics. His father was a magistrate, of rather liberal ideas, and eventually young Jacques went to the Université Libre of Brussels, to study law. There he became a Catholic, and so continued his law studies at the Catholic University of Louvain, where he received the doctorate in law. He then entered the seminary at Malines in 1914 to study for the priesthood, and finished his theological studies three years later, being ordained by Cardinal Mercier in 1917. Later he received the doctorate in philosophy at the Louvain Institute of Philosophy, and was appointed Professor of Natural Law at the Institut St. Louis, in Brussels. In November 1926 he founded a general cultural review of democratic tendencies entitled *La Cité Chrétienne*, which he edited until it went out of existence on May 10, 1940. He has taken a very active part in Catholic Action in Belgium, and was the founder and chaplain of *Jeunesse Universitaire Chrétienne*, the university students' counterpart of the J. O. C., but this, too, went out of existence during the second World War and has not been revived. The *Secrétariat d'Action Familiale* was also founded by Canon Leclercq to make studies of family life, which were published regularly from 1930 to 1938. All studies and propaganda about family life were centralized in Belgium in 1938 as a Family Action movement

and so his Secretariat was merged with other social action groups. In the same year, 1938, he became Professor of Moral Philosophy and Sociology at the University of Louvain.

One of the most eminent Catholics in Europe, who seems to have taken part in almost all important movements of socio-philosophy under Catholic auspices in various European countries, Canon Leclercq has written some twenty books, and numerous articles for many of the Belgian Catholic journals which have existed during his writing career. He is not associated with any particular school of thought, but has presented the results of his own thinking on many topics. A number of his works are not of the scholarly type, but for popular consumption; however, he has written works of real scholarship.

His chief works of university calibre are six: the *Introduction a la sociologie*, with which we are here concerned; (1); *Les Grandes lignes de la philosophie morale* (published in Paris); and the excellent series of four volumes on the natural law — *Le Fondement du droit de la société, L'Etat ou la politique, La Famille, Les droits et devoirs individuels*. All these, except the sociological work, are, of course, in the realm of social philosophy. His book on the family was published in a well adapted translation in this country in 1941 (Pustet & Co.,) and has had a wide sale as a textbook in philosophy.

His other works may be divided into three categories: First, spiritual writings, such as his *Au fil de l'année liturgique*, and *Trente méditations sur la vie chrétienne*; secondly, hagiography, such as the life of St. Catherine of Sienna, the life of St. Francis of Sales, the Saints of Belgium; and thirdly, popular writings on religious and semi-religious topics, such as *La mariage chrétien, Culture et personne, Vocation du Chrétien, La communauté populaire, La vie du Christ dans son Eglise, Essais de morale catholique* a) *Le retour a Jesus*, b) *Le dépouillement*, c) *La vie intérieure*, d) *La vie en ordre*.

At the present time Canon Leclercq teaches under what would be a strange title in America. He became Professor of Moral Philosophy and Sociology at the University of Louvain.<sup>2</sup> In general, what are termed socio-

1. *Introduction a la sociologie*. Louvain: Institute de Recherches Economiques et Sociales de l'Université de Louvain, 1948. Pp. 272. 80 francs belges.

2. Recently the Department of Sociology at the Catholic University of America has made a similar, though more limited, alliance, announcing that students for the M.A. degree in sociology might do their major work in "Catholic social principles" (*American Catholic Sociological Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, October 1947, p. 221).

logical studies at the University have dealt rather with social work or social philosophy, but despite the combined title which he holds, and his double interests, for some time now Canon Leclercq has advocated clear-cut sociological studies, distinct from social philosophy, or from the art of social work. For several years he has been giving courses in sociology at the Louvain **Institut de recherches économiques et sociales**, and recently articles of his on the subject have appeared in the *Bulletin* of this Institute.<sup>3</sup> During the past summer he opened a week's summer university course (July 26-31, 1948) at the *Ecole des Sciences Politiques et Sociales* at the University, under the title of *Initiation a la sociologie*.

Canon Leclercq is one of the few Catholic philosophers who have been able to see clearly the value, object, and methods of sociology, and to delimit these clearly and satisfactorily, from social philosophy. Whatever may be his title at the university, and his main interests, Canon Leclercq has shown clearly that he understands sociology as a science, its aims, and its place.

As is obvious, his one book on sociology, the *Introduction a la sociologie* is not an impressive tome. It is, rather, a simple, straightforward exposition of the subject which would definitely be of value to senior majors in our colleges and to graduate students who need to get an over-all picture of the subject. The book opens with three chapters which give the history of sociology from early studies of society to the present day. These are followed by seven chapters which are on the following topics: the object of sociology; the divisions of sociology; sociology and problems of truth; sociology and traditional philosophy; the nature and formation of a social fact; the spirit of sociology; and the chief methods of sociology. To attempt to give an outline of the book would be impossible in one short article and hardly of value to our members. Canon Leclercq has devoted most of his time to sociology in general and to French and German sociologists in particular. In some ways he shows that he knows the American field rather well: that he has an insight into it is certain, even though his bibliography for American sociologists would seem to indicate a lack of knowledge of the vastness of the literature here, and he has entirely ignored the American Catholic Sociological Society.

3. Cf., "Dimensions de la sociologie," *Bulletin de l'Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales de l'Universite de Louvain*, Vol. XII, fasc. 7, October 1946; "Les problemes de la sociologie religieuse." *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 7, June 7, 1948.

What is of especial interest is Canon Leclercq's analysis of the place of sociology in relation to philosophy and vice versa. There is a variety of opinions among Catholic sociologists in the United States regarding the aim and scope of sociology. Currently, one school of thought is represented in some recently published works, in one of which it is stated that there is a "Catholic sociology," the words of Pope Pius XI: "disciplina socialis Catholica" are translated as "Catholic sociology,"<sup>4</sup> and Catholic sociology is defined as "the study of human society by the method of observation and experience in the light of principles accepted from philosophy and theology."<sup>5</sup> Another author says that sociology is "inevitably philosophical,"<sup>6</sup> "inevitably ethical,"<sup>7</sup> and that a "Catholic sociology is necessary."<sup>8</sup>

Other Catholic sociologists have adopted a point of view which has been called "conformist sociology,"<sup>9</sup> although they have ideas somewhat akin to those of Canon Leclercq, outlined below. In the United States, however, these so-called "conformists" are not usually concerned with any synthesis involving Catholic social principles.

Still others, including the writer of this article,<sup>10</sup> would follow Leclercq, if not all the way, at least most of the way, adding however, the necessity of keeping certain philosophical and theological truths clearly in view, and possibly differing as to where the synthesis should take place. Indeed, to the present writer, it is the place of synthesis which is a matter which espe-

4. Furfey, Rev. P. H. *The Mystery of Iniquity*. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1944, pp. 80-81.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83. The same author includes social ethics as a "legitimate division of sociology" (ACSR, Vol. VI, No. 1, March 1945, p. 10). He called for "an International Congress of Catholic Sociology" (ACSR, Vol. VIII, No. 3, October 1947, p. 220). Cf. also footnote No. 2 above.

6. Murray, Rev. R. W., C.S.C., *Introductory Sociology*, 2nd ed. New York: F.S. Crofts & Co., 1946, p. 30.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

9. Furfey, Rev. P. H., *The Mystery of Iniquity*, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-75.

10. The writer of this article expressed views more in line with her viewpoint here in "Sociology: a field for Catholics," *The Catholic Educational Review*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 8, October 1940, and in such later writings as "The Sociologist's Contribution to Postwar Reconstruction," ACSR, Vol. IV, No. 1, March 1943, p. 3, "The Sociologist and Postwar Reconstruction," ACSR, Vol. V, No. 1, March 1944, pp. 10-11, *Sociology and Social Problems* (Milwaukee. The Bruce Publishing Co., 1948) and especially her address: "Catholic Sociologists and the Social Crisis" at the Ninth Annual Convention of the ACSS, January 30, 1948 — than in her articles: "Sociology and the Catholic," the first article of the ACSR, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1940, pp. 8-9, "Christian Social Concepts and the Sociologist," ACSR, Vol. II, No. 2, June 1941, and in *Fundamental Sociology*.

cially needs earnest consideration and further discussion. This group does not favor the use of the term "Catholic sociology", neither does it favor the inclusion of social philosophy as a special "division" of sociology.

So there are at least three viewpoints among American Catholic sociologists, which is why Canon Leclercq's new book is of considerable interest.<sup>11</sup>

Stating that social science consists in studying social facts with the sole view of knowing them exactly, classifying them, and establishing laws or constants which are derived from the facts (*Introduction a la sociologie*, p. 85). Canon Leclercq differentiates sociology as a distinct branch of the social sciences, and makes it the study of society as it is (p. 93). It is "the science which devotes itself to a positive study of interhuman facts as such, or the science which studies human acts, on the positive plane, in their relations with common life, in so far as they depend on this and vice versa" (p. 93). Sociology, continues Leclercq (p. 97), is both a point of view and a spirit. Its work is to analyse and explain rather than to organize or reorganize society (p. 51). Its object is found in social reality which is common to many sciences, but sociology has a special point of view towards these realities, a special spirit where, as he says in the chapter on the spirit of sociology, definitions and classifications must follow the study of facts, not precede them (p. 212).

According to Leclercq, the sociologist lives in social reality, and his attention is constantly drawn to concrete social problems by the preoccupations of the social surroundings in which he lives. But he does not think it necessary for sociologists always to start off with general philosophical principles at all (pp. 134-137): "Does not sociology need a general idea of man and his destiny in order to direct his work?" is a question which is often asked, he says. His answer is: "No." He gives an analogy of sampling the water of the ocean, when you get satisfactory results from random samples without any particular choice of samples. Inevitably, he says, one will find similarities and differences between the elements chosen at random, and these will lead to further observations and more systematic verifications. Social life

11. Of course, apart from Father Murray's specific statements quoted above, what he, or the writer of this article, include in their introductory sociology texts is beside the point here, for beginning students need a variety of background knowledge in biology, psychology, social history, anthropology, social philosophy, theology and so forth, which any comprehensive introductory text supplies.

is so unified despite its great variety, that any social fact taken at random would probably lead to the discovery of certain constants. Such constants would emerge more and more clearly, so that similarities and differences would lead to further, more systematic studies, by which will lead to further observations and more systematic verifications. One can choose the social facts one studies, and to choose, one must have a standard of choice, which Leclercq locates in the special method and spirit of sociology. Sociology must be content, he says (p. 118) to remain in a narrow specialist field and to furnish other sciences such as social philosophy, law, economics, criminology, education, with more and more information, so that these can become more precise and can correct their findings.

Leclercq sees clearly that there is still much philosophy intermingled with the general sociology of those who profess to have no religious or philosophical "bias." Sociology, he says, is often confused because it is still imbued with the positivistic illusion that the principle comes out of knowing the fact (p. 124), and he shows how many people still confound sociology with early philosophical writings on society (p. 130), although sociology is gradually liberating itself from philosophical preoccupations and often now is not calling any philosophy into its findings. Correctly seeing the beginnings of sociology in philosophy (p. 35), and especially in anti-clerical positivism (p. 36), he thinks that people were interested in the latter because they saw that Christianity was in a decline and on the defensive; organic theories of society had their roots in philosophy too, he says, as did all discussion of social reality (p. 49). He thinks it is a pity that the word *sociology* seems to have a special cachet for many, and as the term *sociologist* is not protected by law, like that of medical doctor, many social philosophers and others are called sociologists, and sociological terms are incorporated into many philosophical writings.

It is his idea, clearly stated (p. 137), that the work of sociology is not to preoccupy itself with the teachings of social philosophy. He sees clearly, of course, that moral and religious facts can be treated in a sociological fashion, and he does not leave a consideration of these wholly to philosophers and theologians (pp. 140-146).<sup>12</sup> But he goes into some detail on the ques-

12 Cf. also Leclercq, Jacques, "Les problemes de la sociologie religieuse," *Bulletin de l'Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales de l'Universite de Louvain*, Vol. XIII, No. 7, June 7, 1948. The present writer showed how Christian social concepts might be studied sociologically: "Christian Social Concepts and the Sociologist," *ACSR*, Vol. II, No. 2, June 1941, pp. 91-92.

tion of freedom of will and on the idea of "nature" as applied to men by sociologists and its implications for sociological studies, saying that these considerations have often led Catholics to place excessive emphasis on philosophical considerations to the neglect of the investigation of observable facts. He shows that neither freedom nor the idea of a common human nature possessed by all men are incompatible with the existence of regularities in social life which are capable of formulation as sociological laws. Indeed, he says (p. 171) that from the point of view of social life, the role of free will is extremely limited. All science admits to a margin of error, and that resulting from free will in sociological findings does not seem to be more than the margin allowed for by the so-called exact sciences. As he points out (p. 178), human beings do not seem to act from consciously free choice in a very great part of their daily behavior.

On the contrary, Leclercq develops his idea that social philosophy can only gain by taking into account the empirical data gathered by sociologists. "Sociology thus appears as the indispensable handmaid of social philosophy. In the measure that sociology brings forward a great number of controlled facts, social philosophy will gain in accuracy . . . Certain discussions which have dragged along in books of theory for two thousand years, without close verification of contradictory facts on which each theorist rests his thesis, could be cast aside. The role of sociology in the progress of social philosophy has an importance which it would be difficult to exaggerate" (p. 140).

Finally, Leclercq comes to the all important question as to where the synthesis of the findings of sociology as of other social sciences should take place: where should norms and ultimate realities be incorporated with the findings of scientific research. For this, Leclercq foresees a master science, a supreme social science, which he calls social politics (p. 86). For him, social politics will be the meeting point for theology, philosophy, and science, the normative science which would apply the principles of theology and philosophy to the findings of science. Should it be the sociologist who will provide the synthesis, as the present writer has thought it a necessary condition of accurate interpretation of social facts? Should one follow Leclercq and make the synthesis outside the field of sociology? Should one allow the synthesis to fall within higher branches of sociology? Should one divorce oneself from the general idea of sociology, and synthesize, as it were, from the start, as those who talk of "Catholic sociology" imply? These questions,

as well as those of the practical use of sociological findings, are of vital concern to sociologists, and especially to Catholic sociologists, for we have not yet attained full status as sociological thinkers in the United States. Professor Robert MacIver in his recent book **A More Perfect Union** has brought social planning within the orbit of the trained sociologist, clearly defining the field of sociology, however, and showing clearly when he goes outside of it. The present author thinks that in like manner we may ourselves have to provide the synthesis, not leaving it to the social philosopher, as Leclercq would have us do (pp. 86, 140, 225 etc.). But whether in this we go outside our field, or whether it is to be considered as part of our field, all this must be the subject of careful consideration and discussion. That is why the present writer hopes that the newly formed Committee on Social Theory and the History of Sociology will have some views to offer to members of the American Catholic Sociological Society. Unanimous agreement is hardly to be expected, but discussions such as those of Canon Leclercq can contribute much to a necessary clarification of ideas.

Trinity College, Washington 17, D. C.

## Social Legislation To Curb Divorce

PAUL E. FITZSIMMONS

THE INCREASE in the divorce rate, which has become a matter of national concern, has been felt in every American jurisdiction. This increase was especially noticeable in 1946 when the rate per 1,000 population was 4.3. By the end of 1946 many of the hasty war marriages and older marriages which did not survive the war time separation had been dissolved in the divorce courts. While the number of divorces in 1947 showed an appreciable decrease, the rate is still so high that it amounts to a national calamity.

Our present system of divorce laws is most confusing and the administration thereof is a disgrace to our entire judicial system. National surveys have indicated that 90% of all divorce actions are not contested, and well founded estimates indicate that at least 85% of all divorce decrees are the result of collusion and perjured testimony. Attorneys as a profession abhor this situation; judges who would like to remedy this problem are impotent to do so under present legislation; parties to such actions are led to believe that our entire judicial system is conducted in such a manner. Such disrespect for our judicial system, one of the touchstones of our democracy, is most unfortunate, especially when one recognizes that the legal profession is as honorable as any other lay profession.

To large segments of the public marriage is no longer "the union of a man and woman for life," but rather the union of a man and woman until they agree to disagree. When such an agreement is reached, in too many instances, the parties tailor their evidence to furnish the basis for obtaining a divorce under the appropriate state statute. The children are the unfortunate victims of such easy divorces. Living under unnatural conditions, without the security of a sound family life, the children have a tendency to become restless and emotionally distraught. Statistics indicate that a disproportionate number of such children become juvenile delinquents.

Much has been written about the deleterious effects of divorce, but very few practical and constructive suggestions have been made to effect a remedy for this problem. Before attempting to offer a solution, an analysis should be made of what has been done and what can be done by one or more of the following: I. Individual state legislation; II. Federal divorce statute, III. Uniform state law.

### INDIVIDUAL STATE LEGISLATION

A number of states have had for many years a fixed policy to closely regulate the issuance of divorce decrees. This strong policy, however, has been thwarted on many occasions by persons who leave the state of their domicile to obtain a divorce in a sister state, the divorce laws of which are less stringent. It is obvious in most of these "tourist" divorce cases that the party had no intention of acquiring a bona fide domicile in the foreign state, and hence its courts had no jurisdiction to enter a valid divorce decree.<sup>1</sup> Notwithstanding this lack of jurisdiction, a number of states recognize such divorces on the theory of comity.<sup>2</sup> The reasons advanced for such an illogical position are as follows: (1) failure to recognize the foreign divorce decree would place clouds on the title of property; (2) innocent offspring of a subsequent marriage might be bastardized.

Temporarily the Supreme Court of the United States appeared to support the view that such divorces were valid only in the state in which they were entered. In the case of *Williams v. North Carolina*<sup>3</sup> the Supreme Court affirmed the bigamy conviction of two residents of North Carolina who spent six weeks in Nevada and after the entry of their respective divorce decrees married each other. The parties then returned to North Carolina where the bigamy conviction followed. It is to be noted that only one party to each marriage made an appearance in the Nevada court. The basis of the Supreme Court decision was that the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution does not require a state to respect a foreign divorce when the forum lacked jurisdiction (domicile of one of the parties to the marriage). To ascertain the jurisdictional fact of domicile in Nevada, the North Carolina court was justified in examining the conduct of the defendants; and the evidence was sufficient to support its finding that dom-

1. *Andrews v. Andrews*, 188 U.S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237, 47 L.Ed. 366 (1902).

2. *Miller v. Miller*, 89 Kan. 151, 131 p. 681 (1913).

icile had not been acquired in Nevada. This decision appeared to strengthen the position of those states which had a strong public policy in regard to marriage and divorce.

Owing to constitutional limitations and the nature of the divorce action, the United States Supreme Court is rarely called upon to decide a question relating to divorce. In recent years when such a case has reached the Court, instead of clarifying an already muddled field of law, very often the Court adds greater confusion and appears to reverse well established precedents. On June 7, 1948, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions which were astounding, startling and distressing and which added more uncertainty to the chaotic status of migratory divorces.<sup>4</sup> In the *Sherrer* case the wife, a resident of Massachusetts, went to Florida allegedly for a vacation; but after she had resided there for the necessary statutory period, she filed suit for divorce. The husband, upon receiving notice of the divorce action, procured counsel who entered a general appearance and filed an answer denying the allegations of his wife's complaint, including the allegation of her Florida residence. The Florida court granted the divorce, specifically finding that the wife was a bona fide resident of Florida. After the entry of this decree the husband brought a separate action in Massachusetts seeking authority to convey his real estate as if he were a single man. In denying his request, the trial court found that the wife was never domiciled in Florida and hence so far as Massachusetts was concerned she was still married to her first husband. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the action of the trial court on the ground that the requirements of the full faith and credit clause did not preclude the Massachusetts courts from re-examining the findings of domicile made by the Florida court.<sup>5</sup>

In reviewing this case, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the Massachusetts court on the ground that where the divorce action had been contested and a specific finding had been made as to the domicile of the wife, such finding and decree were entitled to full faith and credit and could not be subjected to a collateral attack in Massachusetts by a

3. 325 U.S. 226, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 65 S. Ct. 1092 (1945).

4. *Sherrer v. Sherrer*, — U.S. — 68 S. Ct. 1087 (1948); *Coe v. Coe*, — U.S. — 63 S. Ct. 1094 (1948).

5. *Sherrer v. Sherrer*, 320 Mass. 351, 69 N.E. 2d 801 (1946).

party to the original divorce action. Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Murphy in the dissent stated:

"... the decision just announced is calculated, however unwittingly to promote perjury... Not only is today's decision fraught with the likelihood of untoward consequences. It disregards a law that for a century has expressed the social policy of Massachusetts, and latterly of other states, in a domain which under our Constitution is peculiarly the concern of the States and not of the Nation."<sup>6</sup>

Reference is here made to the Massachusetts General Laws, c208, Section 39, (1932), which provides:

"A divorce decreed in another jurisdiction according to the laws thereof by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of both the parties shall be valid and effectual in this commonwealth; but if an inhabitant of this commonwealth goes into another jurisdiction to obtain a divorce for a cause occurring here while the parties resided here, or for a cause which would not authorize a divorce by the laws of this commonwealth, a divorce so obtained shall be of no force or effect in this commonwealth."

The majority opinion appears to adopt the proposition that was repudiated in *Andrews v. Andrews*:

"That marriage may not be dissolved by the consent of the parties, but that they can, by their consent, accomplish the dissolution of the marriage tie by appearing in a court foreign to their domicile and wholly wanting in jurisdiction, and subsequently compel the courts of the domicile to give effect to such judgment despite the prohibitions of the law of the domicile and the rule of public policy by which it is enforced."<sup>7</sup>

The attempt of the majority of the court in the *Sherrer* case<sup>8</sup> to distinguish the *Andrews* case<sup>9</sup> was not convincing. As a result of the decision in the *Sherrer* case and its companion case, *Coe v. Coe*,<sup>10</sup> it would appear that parties who have agreed to disagree may terminate the civil bonds of marriage by resorting to the courts of an easy divorce jurisdiction and by making a general appearance they may use the full faith and credit clause to defy the state of their domicile from enforcing its public policy in regard to divorce.

From the foregoing it would appear that until these decisions are over-

6. *Sherrer v. Sherrer*, — U.S. — 68 S.Ct. 1087, p. 1097 (1948).

7. 188 U.S. 14, 23 S.Ct. 237, 47 L.Ed. 366 (1902).

8. — U. S. — 1087 S. Ct. 1087 (1948).

9. 188 U. S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366 (1902).

10. — U. S. — 68 S. Ct. 1094 (1948).

ruled or until the inferences drawn therefrom are clarified by subsequent decisions, it will be impossible for a single state to effectively enforce its public policy in regard to marriage and divorce.

### FEDERAL DIVORCE STATUTE

Many persons have suggested that the divorce problem might be solved if Congress passed a statute which would be uniformly administered in the several states. This is easier said than done. Before Congress could legislate on marriage and divorce an amendment would be necessary.

Commencing in 1884, resolutions have been presented to almost every session of Congress, providing for a constitutional amendment giving Congress the power to legislate on marriage and divorce. In 1923 and in every session of Congress thereafter Senator Capper has introduced a proposal for a constitutional amendment whereby "the Congress shall have power to make laws which shall be uniform throughout the United States on marriage and divorce, the legitimacy of children, and the care and custody of children affected by annulment of marriage or by divorce." Needless to say, these resolutions have not been favorably acted upon. The following points should be considered by those who think that the entrance of the Federal Government into the field of marriage and divorce would tend to rectify this social-legal problem:

(1) There is a strong feeling in many quarters that marriage and divorce is one field in which the state should retain plenary power. (2) The divorce statute which Congress enacted for the District of Columbia and the administration thereof has not aroused the admiration of observers. (3) If a constitutional emendment were drafted, ratification by the required number of states would probably take many years.

### UNIFORM STATE LAW

A uniform divorce law for the several states has been talked about more than any other uniform law during the last fifty years, but in no field has so little been accomplished. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has been pre-eminently successful in the field of commercial law, but in the field of domestic relations the uniform laws which have been promulgated have met with little response from the state legislatures.<sup>11</sup>

11. The Commissioners approved a uniform divorce act in 1907. Up to 1945 only three states — Delaware, New Jersey and Wisconsin — enacted it. In 1927 the Commissioners' approval of this act was withdrawn.

In 1912 the Conference approved the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act. This act has been adopted by Massachusetts, Illinois, Louisiana, Vermont and Wisconsin.

In order to clarify some of the legal problems presented by the decision of *Williams v. North Carolina*,<sup>12</sup> the Conference approved the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act in September, 1948. It is expected that during 1949 this Act will be submitted to the legislatures of fourteen states.

While a uniform state law may be the only practical method of attacking this problem, one who has had experience in framing uniform legislation or who has made a study of uniform legislation will recognize that there are many obstacles to this course of action. Some of the reasons for this conclusion are as follows:

1. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws met for the first time in 1892 and from that date to 1948 it has authorized the promulgation of approximately one hundred uniform acts. Of this number there is but one act which has been enacted by every American jurisdiction, i.e., the Negotiable Instruments Law.

2. In no instance will the uniform act be passed verbatim in the forty-eight states and territories.

3. In many instances, sections of the statute which were deemed vital to the drafters will be omitted entirely by the legislatures of a number of states.

4. In other states new sections will be added to the statute to satisfy its public policy.

5. Even if the uniform act were enacted in toto by all states, the interpretation placed thereon by the courts will vary from state to state to such an extent that the objectives of the framers of the act would be largely defeated.

6. Many people think that marriage and divorce are topics which are not adapted to uniformity of treatment.

7. The divorce mill states would never adopt a uniform divorce law.

Perhaps the difficulty has been that those who have attempted to modernize divorce laws have been proceeding upon the wrong premise. Up to the present time the divorce proceeding is contentious in nature, and emphasis

12. 325 U. S. 226, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 65 S.Ct. 1092 (1945).

is placed upon punishment of the guilty party rather than upon reconciliation and rehabilitation of the family unit.

The National Conference on Family Life, the American Bar Association, the National Association of Women Lawyers, state bar associations and others have been directing their efforts to a radical change in the divorce proceeding.<sup>13</sup> Their suggestion is that the divorce court should become a socialized court which should attempt to diagnose the cause of the marital failure and, after finding the cause, do everything in its power to effect a reconciliation. To achieve this result the judge, a specialist in domestic relations problems, would have the assistance of social case workers, psychiatrists, doctors, lawyers, priests, ministers and rabbis. If all of the court's efforts failed and the parties still desired a severance of the civil ties of marriage, the divorce decree would be granted in an informal hearing without forcing the parties to participate in the farcical hearings that constitute the divorce actions of today. In view of the fact that all previous efforts have not been productive of result, this movement should be given every assistance so that this program may be drafted into the form of a model state law. Before any such law is drafted, it would seem prudent for the American Bar Association and the National Conference on Family Life to endeavor to have an even wider representation of persons and organizations in the social-legal field. If this is done, it is probable that a more acceptable act would be presented, and such act would have a better chance of passage in the legislatures of the several states.

No matter how perfect this act might be, there are at least five states — Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Nevada and Wyoming — which would be reluctant to enact the statute because at the present time they derive considerable revenue from the migratory divorce business. If these five states failed to adopt such a statute, some progress would have been made and the objective of the act would not have been defeated entirely. Present estimates indicate that of all the divorces granted annually in the United States only 3% are of a migratory nature. But query would this percentage remain constant if a model divorce law were enacted in forty-three states? Observations of divorce quite generally are granted after a hearing of four minutes or less. Is

13. "Marriage and Divorce Laws," 33 *Women Lawyers Journal* 23 (1947); "Principles of a Modern Uniform Divorce Law," 24 *Women Lawyers Journal* 10 (1948); *Journal of the Missouri Bar*, August 1948, p. 204.

it not probable that if the divorce proceedings were lengthened, many parties who had agreed to sever the civil ties of their marriage would travel to a divorce mill jurisdiction in order to terminate their marriage with dispatch?

In discussing divorce, sight must never be lost of the fact that divorce is not the cause, but merely a symptom of the break-down of the family unit. More than legislation would be necessary to handle these underlying causes. In the meantime, every thinking person should strive to publicize the present conditions of divorce and should demand that immediate action be taken by legislative groups, acting with the advice of socio-legal organizations.

St. Louis University School of Law, St. Louis 8, Mo.

## NEWS OF SOCIOLOGICAL INTEREST

In addition to the research committee listed in the December 1948 issue of the *Review*, the following committees are also functioning:

**Committee on Ecology:** Joseph W. McGee, Marquette University.

**Committee on Social Research:** Ruth Reed, Catholic University of America.

**Committee on the History and Theory of Sociology:** Eva J. Ross, Trinity College.

**Committee on Inter-American Cooperation:** Rev. Paul Hanly Furfey, Catholic University of America.

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The Philadelphia Chapter of the American Catholic Sociological Society held its spring meeting on Mar. 12, 1949 at LaSalle College.

A faculty panel discussion was held on the topic: "What About Overpopulation?" Taking part were: Sister M. Helen de Sales, Rev. Charles F. Gorman, Donald N. Barrett, Joseph L. Cross, John H. Donnelly, Brother Augustine, F.S.C., Rev. Richard M. Plunkett, O.S.A., Rev. William E. Campbell, Jane Upchurch, and Jerome J. Rozycki.

A student panel discussion was held on the topic: "What About Segregation?" Taking part were students from the following colleges: Rosemont, College of Chestnut Hill, St. Joseph's, LaSalle, Immaculata, Villanova, Manor, and Gwynedd-Mercy Junior College.

Father Paul Hanly Furfey of the

Catholic University of America gave the address at the concluding session on "The Danger of Bias in Sociological Research".

About 450 persons attended the meeting. Officers of the Philadelphia chapter are: Rev. Anthony Ostheimer (Roman Catholic High School for Boys), Chairman; Joseph L. Cross (College of Chestnut Hill), vice-chairman; Rev. Richard M. Plunkett, O.S.A. (Villanova College) treasurer; and Sister M. Helen de Sales, S.S.J. (College of Chestnut Hill), secretary.

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**Trinity College:** Eva J. Ross will be in Great Britain and Europe for four months this summer. She plans to visit the *Semaines Sociales, Economie et Humanisme* headquarters, and other Catholic social movements.

**Loyola University (Chicago):** The School of Social Work will sponsor an Institute on Social Services in the Community: Organization and Integration, July 5 through July 22, 1949. Institute sessions will be held on The Community and Financial Need, Group Work, Health Services, Protective Services and Case Work. Sister Bertrand, Linn Brandenburg, Wayne McMillen, Mary J. McCormick, Edward A. Piszcek, Ralph Riley and Matthew Schoenbaum will be among the Institute leaders.

The University will sponsor an Institute on Protective and Corrective Care, June 20-25, 1949 for "police officers, probation and parole officers, attendance officers, and those

engaged in or interested in the treatment, prevention, and correction of adult and juvenile crime."

The following topics will be discussed: The Field of Protective Care, The Home and the Child, The Contribution of Recreation, Socialization through Agency Programs, The New Socialized Courts, The Social Function of the School, New Techniques in the Fields of Probation and Parole, The Church, The Clinic, and the Juvenile Court, The Social Role of Police and Attendance Officers. Russell W. Ballard, Jesse F. Binford, Charles W. Leonard, Joseph B. Meehan, Clifford R. Shaw, William J. Szarat, and Dora Somerville are among those who will address the group.

For further information about both of these institutes, address Loyola University, Room 601, Chicago 11, Illinois.

**Catholic University of America:** A workshop on "Education for Marriage and Family Living" will be held on the campus, June 10 to June 21, 1949.

General Conferences will be held on the following topics: The Importance of Education for Marriage, The Moral Obligation of the Home, the School, and the Church to Educate for Family Living, Interviewing Technique and Marriage Education, Using Psychological Tests in Educating for Marriage and the Family, The Respective Roles of Marriage Education and Marriage Counseling, What Education Do We Need for Marriage and Family Living?, Using the Services of the Physician and Psychiatrist, Psycho-somatic Factors in Marriage, What Qualifications and Training Must Educators for Marriage Possess?, What the Church Can Do to educate for marriage and the Family. Seminars will be on education for marriage and the family

(a) on the high school level (b) in colleges (c) in the armed services (d) in medical and nursing schools, and (e) among adults.

in the armed services (d) in medical and nursing schools, and (e) among adults.

Lecturers and consultants will be the Very Reverend Francis J. Connell, C.S.S. R., Marie Corrigan, Sister Paul-ette, Ad.PP.S., Rev. James A. Magner, Rev. John J. O'Sullivan, Herbert A. Ratner, Rev. Lawrence F. Schott, and Rev. John W. Stafford, C.S.V.

For further information write to Alphonse H. Clemens, director of the workshop.

**Fordham University New York):** Nicholas S. Timasheff has been promoted to a full professorship. He is presently writing a monograph dealing with the conflict of United States and Russia to be entitled, *Disunited Nations...* The Declan X. McMullen Press published his *Probation in the Light of Criminal Statistics* last February. He collaborated with Father Paul W. Facey, S. J., Holy Cross College, to write a new introductory sociology text, *Sociology, An Introduction to Sociological Analysis* to be published by Bruce Publishing Company. Dr. Timasheff is offering three new seminar courses during the current academic year: Communist Society, Social Causation and Sociological Classics.

Father Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, S. J., who received his doctorate at Harvard, was appointed Instructor of Sociology in the Graduate School. He is conducting a seminar on industrial sociology and will offer in 1949-50 the following courses: Scope and Method of Social Sciences, Industrial Sociology and Trade Unions. Father Fitzpatrick is preparing his *White Collar Worker on Wall Street* for publication.

Father Franklin Ewing, S. J., was appointed to inaugurate courses in social anthropology. He is the discoverer of "Egbert," the 60,000-year-old skeleton of a small boy unearthed in Lebanon last year. Presently, he is offering a course in applied anthropology to a group of future missionaries.

John D. Donovan is continuing his research in the areas of parochial sociology and sociology of professions.

Dr. Friedrich Baerwald, Associate Professor, is preparing a monograph on the phenomenological approach to the study of social phenomena.

The Fordham College is expanding its sociology department with Father Fitzpatrick and Mr. Donovan offering courses in sociology.

**College of New Rochelle** (New Rochelle, N. Y.): Chester A Jurczak, now completing his doctorate at

Fordham University, has been appointed chairman of the sociology department. He is presently engaged in research dealing with the problems of the union steward.

Professor Helen Toole is presently on leave to organize a social service bureau in Massachusetts.

The Department is offering an Introduction to the Field of Social Work conducted by eight experts from the various branches of social work.

The Catholic Family Institute under the directorship of Mother M. Berenice, O.S.U., Ph.D., is presenting lectures, forums and conferences by well known authorities in various phases of child development and training, and family welfare. In the last two years prominent ACSS members have appeared as lecturers.

BOOK REVIEWS

EVA J. ROSS, Editor

Trinity College, Washington 17, D. C.

**HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY; ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT, THEORIES OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION FROM CAVE LIFE TO ATOMIC BOMBING.** By Harry Elmer Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948 Pp. x + 186. \$3.00.

Barnes' latest, a "comprehensive introduction" to historical sociology, disclaims being "an exhaustive exposition and a detailed bibliographical summary," but attempts "to select the chief typical tendencies and achievements in this branch of sociology." There is no definition of sociology much less of historical sociology; rather there is a positivistic faith in inductive social studies. Thus philosophy and theology are written off hastily with the remark that "One need not concern himself especially with the history of method in sociology before the entry of the Darwinian concepts, for, with few exceptions, the method was deductive or intuitive." (p. 16). In turn, holding to a cultural, rather than biological approach, Barnes regards the study of culture as valid only on the assumption of progressive and self-explanatory change; acknowledging merited criticism of the broad theories of culture and the error of abstractionism in the use of the comparative method, Barnes still favors a "natural science" approach to the study of culture. Accordingly he tags past "non-progressive evolution" writers as lacking in objectivity, though he feels that Morgan, Tylor, Ward and he, with Leslie White, measure up well. Against present writers, whom he regards as too often bogged down in subjectivistic theology and philosophy, Barnes comes crusading for more "science" rather than morality and such. To him, "the difference between the discovery and application of intra-atomic energy and preceding scientific and technological discoveries is one of degree only" (p. 179). Thus the first half of the book is a survey of opinions of interest to Barnes, and the second half is his culture-lag explanation of present world ills. The most quoted authority is Harry Elmer Barnes.

The book, presumably giving us Barnes' mature thoughts, is a reminder of the futility of taking him to the woodshed again for his secularism. His sketches of the ideas of sociologists, however, require at least a sample check for reliability against the original texts and the interpretations of others. For example, Barnes writes, "Durkheim's outstanding contribution in this field was his emphatic demonstration of the social origins and basis of religion and ceremonial life" (p. 52). The only work referred to is *Les Formes elementaires de la vie religieuse* (sic) but Barnes says of this that "The value of his (Durkheim's) book must be found in the author's sociological and psychological acumen and not in the reliability of the method of investigation or

\*Members who wish to review book are invited to write to Miss Ross, stating their special fields of interest. Specific books should be asked for, if possible, with full details of title, author, and publisher. These should be of recent publication and within the scope of sociology or a closely allied subject. Miss Ross will be in Europe this summer. All correspondence should be addressed to her at Trinity College.

of the ethnographical material adduced to substantiate the conclusions" (ibid.). Thus despite his impatience with the "intuition of pre-Darwinian thinkers, Barnes is so satisfied with Durkheim's "acumen" that he later attacks Toynbee for not imitating "the great masters" (p. 111) Durkheim and Max Weber, and in fact Toynbee's main error is cited as not holding "firmly and steadfastly to natural, evolutionary forces" (p. 112) in his explanations. Thus Durkheim is cited as "right" in saying something Barnes liked, with or without evidence or sound method; that would make Durkheim "wrong" in his famous preference for general rather than personal ideas.

Again Barnes finds Westermarck "right" because he "sought to develop a natural, evolutionary theory of moral origins and development, . . . and to demonstrate the secular origin and relativistic nature of moral conceptions and practices. In this he succeeded" (p. 39). But again, Westermarck can hardly be regarded as being equal to Tylor in critical discrimination as to anthropology and sources (p. 38). Thus Westermarck is "right," and similarly Morgan and Gumplovicz are "right" on the origin of the state, and Leslie White is "right" in his approach to the study of culture. As things work out, then, the study of historical sociology becomes a device for labeling and pigeon-holing "right" ideas. It consciously labors under the disadvantage of trying to resurrect the old evolutionary challenge to social studies by exaggerating the importance of whatever truth or validity there was in unilinearism, and of attempting to minimize the worth of ideas not fitting into this scheme. In bitterness, Barnes laments that the "right" ideas have not prevailed, for "The power of the supernatural over human thought has been little affected by scientific progress . . . Belief and conviction remain supreme" (p. 162). Again, "Dodging the issue through metaphysical and mystical befogging of our thought has been the main reason for the alarming growth of cultural lag, until it threatens racial extinction" (p. 169). This point of view for cataloging sociologists' ideas is apparently the main reason Barnes accordingly missed tracing "the chief typical tendencies" in historical sociology, the task of the book.

Because of this point of view, moreover, it is difficult to compare this volume with other sketches of historical sociology; besides such a comparison would be unfair, for Barnes disavows any intention to present complete discussions of men or ideas. In its selection and treatment of authors and ideas, then, this volume is disappointingly unique, but it need not be ignored. Barnes compiles well; the plan of the first half of the book, its definitions of fields and its boiled-down summaries of some famous methodological controversies are well done. Amongst the authors mentioned, moreover, are some too often overlooked, and the citations make the index a good lead to sources.

B. G. MULVANEY, C.S.V.

The Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D. C.

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL LIVING. By William J. Kerby. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1948. P. 132. \$2.75.

This is the fourth volume published under the auspices of the William J. Kerby Foundation. Really, it is the publication of the notes of Monsignor Kerby that were found in manuscript form at the time of his death in 1936.

This work lacks, therefore, the final scrutiny and organization of its author.

The title **Introduction to Social Living** is well chosen for this is not, as some might believe, an introductory text in sociology. It is rather a clear exposition of the philosophy that must lie behind the primary social processes.

The fundamental cycle of socialization, individualization and idealization are treated in succeeding parts of the work. In the fourth and last part the social psychological concepts are handled. This is a small volume but complete in its treatment of the fundamental phase of social living. In places there is evidence to show that these were the outlines and not the complete notes or treatment of the author.

The text is replete with the succinct and complete statement of philosophical truths by Monsignor Kerby. As those who heard him remember, this was his forte. He was the master of both analysis and synthesis.

The third part on idealization sparkles with the full philosophy of the author. The treatment of morality, wholesomeness and progress in this part is unique and appealing. That the Christian concept of life and morality have something real to contribute to a real social philosophy is brought out here.

This is not a text book and should be a part of required reading in our classes of theory, social thought and social philosophy. It is not for sociologists alone; the general public who are interested in social philosophy should enjoy it. We are grateful to the William J. Kerby Foundation for this publication.

REV. RALPH A. GALLAGHER, S. J.

Loyola University, Chicago 11, Ill.

**CATHOLIC SOCIAL ACTION.** By John F. Cronin, S. S. Milwaukee. The Bruce Publishing Co., 1948. Pp. xxi + 247. \$3.50.

During the last fifteen years hundreds of Catholics have been working actively in the Catholic social movement. In labor schools, employer groups, interracial councils, rural life committees, they have been laying the foundation of an organized Catholic effort to apply the teachings of Christ to our social and economic problems.

In **Catholic Social Action** Father Cronin attempts to draw together the experiences of these Catholics, plus his own, into a manual, a handbook for the Catholic priest or laymen who wants to dedicate himself to the work of social reconstruction. This objective the book carries out remarkably well.

There are chapters on social teaching in the schools, social education of adults, training for leadership, and diocesan social action. Father Cronin's emphasis is always practical, always with an insider's awareness of what the real problems are.

Another section of the book deals with social action with workers and employers. Page after page is devoted to careful and detailed descriptions of how the various Catholic groups operate in this field.

The last part of the book is invaluable. It lists Catholic organizations, schools, newspapers engaged in social action. There are an annotated reading list and a chapter on where to look for various kinds of information and help.

Father Cronin's book raises two problems but does not answer them. Catholic social action is defined as a form of Catholic action. Social action is thus the work of Catholic laymen. Yet a major portion of this book is devoted to defining, explaining how priests should take part in social action. By the book's definition, a diocesan social action program, directed, staffed, and operated by priests is not Catholic social action.

The purpose of Catholic social action is well stated: "it concerns itself not so much with the life of the individual but rather with the life of society. It is interested in the problems of social organization and social institutions. It seeks to imprint Christian principles on the whole social fabric, but it is particularly interested in social legislation, social policy, and social systems."

But the book also defines Catholic social action as being an official arm of the Church. If this is so, how can Catholic Social action come to direct grip with the prudential problems of the workaday world? There is no "official" Catholic position on the many economic and social problems which we face and which we must solve. Yet, it is in the world that the Truth and Life of Christ must become incarnate. In this effort the responsibility must be shouldered by Catholic laymen who, acting out of the fullness of their Christian life, apply their principles as union members, employers, lawyers, and farmers — and not as Catholics. They must not tie the Church down to some special plan or program.

These are not idle questions. Upon their answer depends to a very great extent the future development of the Catholic social movement in the United States.

EDWARD A. MARCINIAK

Loyola University, Chicago 11, Ill.

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT: SELECTED PAPERS. By Chester I. Barnard, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948, Pp. xi + 244. \$4.00.

Not the least significant approach which might be made to the writings of Chester Barnard would be through their use in a case study of the author's role as a highly respected business executive and public servant with a keen speculative interest in, among other things, sociology. On the whole, a realistic and discriminating point of view characterizes the nine papers gathered together in this book, which supplements, in effect, his earlier one, *The Functions of the Executive*. Some of these papers have been previously published for general distribution. They represent the author's generalizations, based upon reflection upon his own experiences and roles, and upon critical application of some contemporary social science concepts.

The central concept in Barnard's theory is organization, defined as the systematic coordination of the acts of two or more individuals — "an integrated aggregate of actions and interactions having a continuity in time" (p. 112). Organizations, i.e., particular aggregates, may be formal or informal. "Formal organizations are not independent societies but are rather limited forms of social behaviour growing out of the more general societies of which they are a part" (p. 207); they rest upon the foundation of existing informal organizations and also create new "sub-societies" within which informal organizations can grow to facilitate or impede, as the case may be,

the functioning of the formal. When acts of individuals function simultaneously in two or more organizational systems, the interconnections produce "complex organizations."

This concept of organization is intentionally inclusive and, for Barnard, apparently replaces the concept of the social group. He is evidently of the opinion that the attention of the sociologist, on the structural side, should be focused upon the whole network of relations which can be circumscribed with respect to a given function or set of functions, rather than upon the persons or groups who are the agents in performing the functions. To illustrate, the "organization" of a business enterprise includes the actions of investors, suppliers, and customers, as well as the actions of personnel who are by official definition its officers and members. There is a comment on this concept in the preface:

It puts the emphasis upon organization as coordinated activities rather than upon the individuals who are the actors. The latter are often simultaneously "members of several organizations, and their activities are not infrequently to be conceived as simultaneous functions of more than one organization. Moreover, the relationship of individuals to organization is frequently so ephemeral that they are not conveniently regarded as "members" of an organization, whereas, in my view, certain of their activities must clearly be regarded as a part of the "organized" activities associated with and, as I prefer to think, constituting organization. This concept of organization is a "field" concept in which activities take place in and are governed by a field of "forces," some human and some social, some physical. (p. vii)

This field approach, which Barnard fortunately does not press as far as the topological psychologists to whom he refers, J. F. Brown and Kurt Lewin, rests on more assumptions than can be examined here. The nature of these assumptions may be inferred from a statement once made by Brown that the basic science of human behavior is "socio-psycho-biology." For the present, it is sufficient to note the obscuring of some quite elementary, but meaningful, distinctions. That between the individual and the group, for example, is submerged by Brown and Lewin in treating both individual and group within one descriptive unit, the social field. Hence a new vocabulary is necessitated, etc.

Barnard's concept of organization in, to take his example, the operations of a business enterprise, certainly refers to a set of phenomena which can be observed. With reference to the facts of interdependence in the functioning of the units organized, his concept would seem to be exceedingly useful and important. It seems unwarranted, however, to treat all those whose actions are linked in interdependence as belonging to the same social structure. An organization in Barnard's sense, does not, can not act, as a group can act, though the actions of a person or group involved in the organization will affect all those linked within the network. Those whom Barnard conceives as the agents of organization themselves make distinctions — the customer and the company may indeed regard each other as natural competitors or antagonists — and the sociologist must begin by taking these distinctions into account. Barnard seems to agree with the methodological principle that human actions as data for sociology must be taken with the meanings they have for the agents; as he puts it, "you cannot deal effectively with people unless you get their 'point of view,' which means knowing what 'influences' govern their behavior" (p. 115); but the concept he uses seems to by-pass

the social persons and groups who are the units in the organization. His handling of concrete situations, in which he seems to adhere to an "action" frame of reference, is better than his theory in this respect. In other words, as long as organization is viewed as the dynamic interdependence of actions, the concept seems valid; when the system of interdependence is viewed as a social structure, however, there is no empirical referent, since there is no recognition of a uniting value.

It has seemed best in this review to concentrate upon only one major concept which Barnard has advanced. Others would probably require some clarification or re-interpretation as well before their incorporation into systematic sociological theory. But it should be apparent that Barnard's contributions are both stimulating and significant. He has provided incisive analyses which transcend the immediate practical aspects of the phenomena of organization and has attempted generalizations on the level of science. This is not a common role for an executive.

C. J. NUESSE

The Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D. C.

**BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL MARRIAGE.** By Judson T. Landis and Mary G. Landis. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948. Pp. xii + 559. \$4.50.

This latest of the marriage manuals, a cooperative enterprise of husband and wife, is excellently adapted to its audience because much of it is presented in response to student requests and suggestions over a period of years. For the same reason, marital guidance for veterans is worked into the text in larger measure than in other manuals but not to the extent that it becomes obtrusive.

The book begins with positive attitudes toward marriage and continues, for eight chapters, with a discussion of practical problems in courtship, selection of a mate, and engagement; special emphasis is given to the undesirability of premarital sex relations and mixed marriages. After a chapter on legal control in which Michigan laws are used as a basis for discussion, there follow seven chapters on marital adjustment-psychological, sexual, religious, and economic. Chapters on family planning, child care and training, reproduction, and sex education round out the work.

Inclusion of a chapter on mixed marriage reflects student interest and the growing recognition by sociologists that this is a fruitful field for research. The Catholic position is fairly well stated and a copy of the antenuptial agreement is reproduced verbatim. Since non-Catholic researchers have thus far failed to distinguish valid from invalid marriages and since no Catholic research on the subject is included, the failure rate is somewhat higher than if valid mixed marriages alone were included — or at least given separately. This of course buttresses the conclusion that mixed marriages are undesirable. Another point — a Catholic historian would trace Catholic opposition to the early days of the church, but here it is said to begin "with the intense religious hatreds and wars between Catholics and Protestants during the period of the Reformation." (pp. 133-134).

Many features of the book are worthy of high praise. Space permits citing only a few. In the discussion of birth control, although the moral issue is avoided, emphasis is placed on the desirability of larger families and

the changing of false values. Rhythm is mentioned as being 40 percent effective; Latz's higher figures should be inserted with the qualifications he gives. The planned parenthooders' abortion argument is refuted — with Russian experience. Again, the natural basis for the complementary nature of the sexes is a good thing for students to know and it is well treated (Chapter II) with heavy borrowings from Scheinfeld's *Women and Men*. Further, in regard to economics, the section on Insurance will be very useful as a guide in this confusing field. Finally, the idea of a special chapter for "Religious Attitudes and Family Life" is excellent even though the presentation suffers from the general lack of research in this field; of course, this section will have to be elaborated and modified by the instructor if used in a Catholic college.

On the debit side, the extension of the term "mixed marriage" to include differences of intelligence, education, economic status, and the like will not help to reduce the confusion in terminology. Then, the repetition of similar graphs comparing "very happy," "happy," and "average" marriages is commendable from the point of view of ease of interpretation; but the fact that the "average" group is usually in the minority makes the concept lose its meaning. Presentation of the material on reproduction and sex education is generally sound, but Catholic teachers may question that "high-school young people are sometimes reticent to accept information about marriage from an unmarried instructor." (p. 479). Perhaps "sometimes" is the saving word.

With the qualifications indicated and others which will be obvious, this book can be recommended for use in Catholic colleges.

Graphs, charts, and tables are well done and largely up-to-date. Marriage Prediction Schedule follows the first part of the book. In the appendixes are: a list of marriage counseling agencies; questions, problems, and suggestions for socio-dramas; and a very valuable classified and annotated bibliography.

GERALD J. SCHNEPP, S. M.

St. Louis University, St. Louis 3, Mo.

THE AMERICAN WOMAN IN MODERN MARRIAGE. By Sonya Ruth Das. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948. Pp. 185. \$3.75.

Dr. Das's approach to the role of modern woman in marriage and family relationships is representative of a secular viewpoint which depreciates the stand of the Roman Catholic Church but which supports the position of those who approve of contraception and divorce. In presenting her thesis that the growth of personality among women is the greatest achievement of modern times, Dr. Das reviews the history of marriage; considers the cause and results of divorce; recommends uniform marriage and divorce laws; praises the American family as a democratic institution; suggests a pattern for modern woman in line with her varied roles; and advocates mutual appreciation and respect, love, devotion, and service as the keys to conjugal harmony. By the utilization of statistics, footnotes, bibliography, and index the author gives her book a scholarly appearance. But unfortunately there are occasional typographical errors to detract from the attractively printed and bound volume.

The book is written with purpose and sincerity tinted by a distinctly feminist attitude and by a tendency toward generalizations.

"A new code of feminine ethics should recognize the following elements: First, marriage is a physical, moral and spiritual necessity for the majority of women; second, the ethical basis of marriage is mutual love and affection between man and woman, the termination of which may end in the dissolution of marriage or divorce; third, voluntary motherhood is an essential part of a modern woman, not only for the fullest development of her personality, but also for the intelligent transmission of hereditary characteristics and for the adjustment of optimum population to maximum production; fourth, marriage is an essential condition, not only for parenthood, which every man and woman owes to the child, but also for the social recognition of the union of man and woman for common life; and finally, as a social institution, marriage requires social and legal sanction for its performance, existence and dissolution." (p. 171).

While we cannot agree with Dr. Das on many issues we observe throughout her work a serious intention to suggest ways and means for greater individual happiness in marriage under our democratic system of society. Dr. Das has assembled some data on the political, social, legal, and economic status of women that will be of interest to readers.

MARGARET MARY TOOLE

College of Notre Dame of Maryland, Baltimore 10, Maryland

WHAT COMES OF TRAINING WOMEN FOR WAR. By Dorothy Schaffter, Washington, D. C., American Council on Education, 1948. Pp. x + 223. \$3.00.

The major part of this book is concerned with how the women's service corps were trained and what they did for the war effort rather than with a reply to the question: "What Comes of Training Women for War?" It contains, however, not only the history of this important military experiment but also information of value in many other fields. The Public Health Service is informed that 13% of all candidates for the Cadet Nursing Corps were rejected because of physical defects. Educators are urged to set more specific aims and concentrate on their fulfillment. Nursing Schools are told that their supervisors should be trained to regard supervision as a channel of service and instruction rather than as a means of detecting derelictions. The business world is advised that women make excellent administrators.

The process of training women for war provided some interesting surprises. Military authorities were amazed that women adjusted themselves to regimentation so easily that many actually liked it, not because of economic security, which their civilian jobs had furnished, but because of the satisfaction of being part of a great endeavor. In the maintenance of discipline, they found that it was essential to lead for women cannot be driven. Women made excellent records in tests of emotional stability, nerve control and emergency organization.

By the end of the war, women were performing every type of officer assignment from judge advocate to quartermaster, but the most important effects of this experiment are the long range results of discipline, group

living and military courtesy which have carry-over value for civilian life. Time has shown that women did not lose sight of the fact that "motherhood is a career in its own right," and many learned "that victory and peace and human welfare have a price, and a high one."

DOROTHY M. PARTON, R.S.C.J.

Manhattanville College of the Sacred Heart, New York 27, N. Y.

CRIMINOLOGY. By Ruth Shonle Cavan. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1948. Pp. 747. \$4.25.

Within the limits of naturalistic dogma, this book is well done. Dr. Cavan gives us a consecutive, smoothly flowing treatise on the nature and facts of crime, the social conditions among which it is especially found, the types of criminals; only after this does she attempt the more abstract and controversial treatment of crime causation. There she favors the multiple theory, slow to deny all validity to any theory, but giving special emphasis to the psychological and the psychoanalytical.

Dr. Cavan is especially concerned with methods of crime prevention; where these have failed she is still most reluctant to imprison, having no illusions regarding that way to reform. The bibliography contains much important, recent material (together with data of research outmoded but not repeated), and makes clear the immense effort put into the writing despite the easy style. Questions covering each chapter promise to be very helpful.

The limitations of this book are almost entirely self-imposed. With no attempt at justification, the author places on the delinquent the shackles of determinism. For her "conduct is the result of the component forces of innate desires and social pressure." In her mind the delinquent "cannot conform." However, she later complains that prison life deprives him of "responsibility," forgetful that responsibility presupposes some power of self-determination. Deterministic science she also thinks has tended to discredit prison chaplains, so that "other specialists have come to the fore as the chief technicians of good conduct." Officials of penal institutions commonly tell a different story. Hear Major Thomas J. Hanlon, Superintendent of the New York State Institutions for Defective Delinquents (such inmates being notoriously difficult to reform):

The most powerful influences in correcting the mentally defective's anti-social, criminalistic and warped social ideas, attitudes and habits are the moral and ethical teachings expounded by Hebrew, Protestant and Catholic Chaplains.

In playing down the influence of the chaplain Dr. Cavan is of course only echoing the "party line" of naturalistic criminology.

Her naturalistic spirit would explain the author's ignoring secularism in public education as a very pertinent factor in delinquency causation. The religious illiteracy of the average convict is of course proverbial. Such testimony as that of Chaplain Hyland of Clinton (New York) State Prison, that only 59 of its 1,160 professed Catholics "had ever attended parochial schools" is heard too often to be brushed aside. Comparison of the results of religious and secular reformatory efforts would also add something to Dr. Cavan's volume; the work of Don Bosco's Salesians and the Good Shepherd nuns would give food for thought.

A few minor desiderata: The book contains nothing of the valuable modern foreign experience in crime and delinquency treatment, such as that of England and Canada. Only a few lines are given to capital punishment, because so seldom used. (This in itself might have occasioned considerable comment.) One thing Dr. Cavan is sure of: Capital punishment is "indefensible from the point of view of reformation." The great number of hardened criminals who before walking the "last mile" ask religious aid and express sorrow or their offenses might suggest rather unique reformation.

Dr. Cavan speaks of reformation as only a recent objective of improvement. It would be more correct to say it is a recently revived objective that was taken for granted much earlier: for example in monastery prisons and in such ecclesiastical prisons as St. Michael's, built by Clement XI (1703), erected as its facade states, "For the correction and education of abandoned youths; that they who, without training, were detrimental to the State, may with training, be of service to it."

The text is well made-up, attractively printed, and in general well proofed. Here the most to be regretted lapse is the repeated (at least three times) misuse of the objective "whom" before parenthetical constructions. It is, I think, the most usable criminology text I know.

J. E. COOGAN, S. J.

University of Detroit, Detroit 21, Mich.

**MOST OF THE WORLD: THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA AND THE EAST TODAY.** Edited by Ralph Linton. New York: Columbia University Press., 1949. Pp. 917. \$5.50.

Would you like to know how many Negroes, Indians and Whites there are in the Union of South Africa, or perhaps, how much wheat was produced in North China last year, or how many million barrels of oil came out of the Near East? Maybe you are interested in the iron and steel potential of Brazil. To all these and a thousand and one other questions on the resources, people, cultures and future of most of the world you will find the answer in this excellent reference work compiled by 14 authors under the direction of Prof. Ralph Linton of Yale University. Geographers, Geopoliticians, Economists, Political Scientists, Sociologists and Anthropologists will welcome these comprehensive surveys. To anyone interested in world affairs **Most of the World** is an indispensable book to have for handy consultation.

**Natural Resources in Most of the World**, by Howard A. Meyerhoff, professor of Geology and Geography at Smith College, attempts to describe those places in the world which have reached their peak of development as well as to outline possible areas whose land and resources have not been exploited to their full extent. His solution for China is industrialization. Also India must expand her industrial economy "if their people are to be salvaged from a future starvation and substandard living which should have no place in the modern world." As a matter of fact there are countless unrealized possibilities "which suggest that the world has far to go before it reaches the Malthusian limit." (p. 91).

While the article by Meyerhoff is highly commendable, the effort by Stephen W. Reed, **World Population Trends**, leaves much to be desired. Although he recommends an increase in agricultural production, the develop-

ment of industry and trade, the promotion of education and literacy, the improvement of health facilities and welfare services, his main cure-all for the so-called overpopulation of China, India, and Egypt is birth control.

John Gillin attempts to be fair in his *Mestizo America*. He believes that, with the increase in the emphasis put upon the more practical aspects of education, "there is some possibility that the higher intellectual culture of Mestizo America will turn out to be a happy blend of humanism and pragmatic science." (p. 210). In the same vein Charles Wagley's description of the potentials of Brazil as a contributor to world culture is very optimistic.

The three African sketches are very up-to-date. All three contributors seem to agree on the rapid awakening of this great continent and its peoples as a vital factor in world affairs. Teachers of courses on Racial Contacts and Conflicts will find some very good material in this section of the book.

Each of the five articles on the Eastern half of the world points to changes that will revolutionize that part of mankind. One wonders whether the rise of democratic thought and behavior in the eastern hemisphere and in other parts of the world will usher in an era of revolution and war. Daily events seem to confirm this prediction. Let us hope that out of these upheavals peace will eventually come to the hearts and minds of men.

S. A. SIEBER, S.V.D.

Chicago 14, Illinois

**MIRROR FOR MAN: THE RELATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY TO MODERN LIFE.** By Clyde Kluckhohn. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949. Pp. xi + 313. \$3.75.

Of more than 250 entries in a contest promoted by Whittlesey House this book won a \$10,000 prize for its author as the one book that contributed most to man's understanding of the world today. It is written in a very literate style and is aimed at the intelligent layman. Kluckhohn's message, despite its positivistic slant and the taint of ethical relativism (which he tries vainly to disavow), may be summed up in his own words: "Anthropology holds up a great mirror to man and lets him look at his infinite variety." The objectivity and detachment which are assumed to be the almost exclusive possessions of anthropologists are little in evidence in such statements as: "The Christian tradition has tended to assume that sex is inherently nasty as well as dangerous" (p. 33). Another example of Kluckhohn's so-called objectivity (sic!) can be seen in his rejection of Niebuhr's argument to the effect that "the universally human sense of guilt and man's capacity for self-judgment necessitate the assumption of supernatural forces," by the facetious declaration: "These facts are susceptible of self-consistent and relatively simple explanation in purely naturalistic terms through the concept of culture" (p. 37).

Although Kluckhohn claims that "anthropology does not as a matter of theory deny the existence of moral absolutes" (p. 41), he makes an appeal for some hazy kind of "secular religion," after the manner of Comte, and a faith "which cannot be successfully based upon super-natural premises" (p. 282). Man's "great emotional adventure" is to "accept responsibility for

the destiny of mankind" (p. 283), but "we don't have to rely upon supernatural revelation to discover that sexual success achieved through violence is bad" (p. 285). The Kinsey report would be as valid a guide to universal human nature as the following generalization of F. C. S. Northrop which Kluckhohn accepts: "The norms for ethical conduct are to be discovered from the ascertainable knowledge of man's nature, just as the norms for building a bridge are to be derived from physics" (p. 286). If one were to follow such a statistical procedure to get a "new perspective to the relativity of the normal," selfishness, greed, profit, privilege, power, and a thousand and one human foibles would be justified and sanctioned.

Chapter IV (Skulls) and Chapter VII (Anthropologists at Work) describe some of the best contributions of anthropologists during the war and in the industrial field.

The discussion on "Personality in Culture" describes Americans as "contemptuous of ideas, amorous of devices;" with money our universal standard of value; "the neurotic personalities of our time;" "a nation of grippers;" "moral masochists;" setting aside Mother's Day "as a symbolic atonement for the lack of recognition ordinarily given to domestic duties;" "criminals from a sense of guilt" (Freud). The outstanding features of the American scene according to Kluckhohn are: "consciousness of diversity of biological and cultural origins; emphasis upon technology and upon wealth; the frontier spirit; relatively strong trust in science and education and relative indifference to religion; unusual personal insecurity; concern over the discrepancy between the theory and practice of culture" (p. 239).

After reading *Mirror for Man* I am greatly concerned over the discrepancy between the theory and practice of some anthropologists.

S. A. SIEBER, S. V. D.

Chicago 14, Illinois.

**THE RURAL COMMUNITY AND ITS SCHOOL.** By Lorene K. Fox. New York: King's Crown Press, 1948. Pp. xi + 233. \$3.25.

**AMERICAN RURAL LIFE.** By David Edgar Lindstrom. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1948. Pp. xi + 385. \$4.00.

Here are two recent books in rural sociology both of which are based on the belief that a better understanding of, and a return to a more healthy basis of rural life is necessary for the maintenance of a healthy nation.

*The Rural Community and Its School* covers more territory than its title indicates. Dr. Fox, studying one county, Chautauqua, in New York, shows how agriculture, family life, and education all have been profoundly influenced by the machine culture of the twentieth century. The book does not develop any new or different thesis. The impact of urban culture, the conflicts resulting from this urban influence, the decline of the influence of the rural church, the trek of the young people to the city, have all been stressed by many writers in recent years.

One point upon which Fox and Lindstrom disagree is the number of rural schools, particularly the traditional one-room school. Lindstrom says (p. 248): "In spite of a definite trend toward consolidation, there are still more one-room schools in the United States than any other kind. The latest educational survey showed more than 96,000 such schools, with an estimated

attendance of nearly 2,500,000 children." Fox, on the other hand, says the country schools are being replaced by the consolidated schools. Of course, it is to be remembered that she is discussing but one county in New York. Her conclusions, however, are supposed to be general enough to be applicable to the country as a whole. After discussing the reluctance of rural folk to relinquish the one-room school, she states (p. 87): "Be that as it may, the resistance has all but broken down in the county at large . . . So the county is dotted with one-and two-room schoolhouses boarded up or converted, and a rapidly decreasing number from which the hum of learning still comes . . ."

One point Dr. Fox emphasizes, and which is also stressed by the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, is that education in rural schools should fit the child for rural living. Though she doesn't use the phrase, she means substantially the same thing the Conference means when it states that agriculture is a way of living not just a way of making a living.

This book is entitled to a widespread reading.

Lindstrom's book, as its title indicates, has a much broader purpose; it is meant for a textbook in rural sociology. It quite adequately fulfills that purpose. The introduction by O. E. Baker is excellent. Dr. Baker gives the keynote of the whole book: "maintenance of the family as an institution for the reproduction of the race and the transmission of wealth and culture from generation to generation." (p.xv). The necessity for healthy rural family life, and its relation to the health of the nation, is considered several times throughout the book.

*American Rural Life* covers substantially the same material considered in most textbooks in rural sociology but it seems to this reviewer to be more practical, more realistic than most. The book is not cumbered by too great a mass of statistics, but has a sufficient number to support the points at issue. The choice of graphs and charts is excellent. Unlike many rural sociology textbooks, there is not a great deal of discussion about theoretical points as the difference in rural and urban attitudes and such things. Instead it develops, quite objectively, the problems and institutions in the entire range of rural life and offers practical suggestions for improvement. As previously stated, the importance of the rural family is the theme which threads its way throughout the entire book. "The family ideal, as it is expressed in most of rural life, involves the recognition of the divine in man and the worth of the human soul" (p. 5). And at the end of the book: "We want and must have a predominance of family-sized owner-operated farms." (p. 370).

Not only is strong family life stressed but also the fact that these families must operate family-sized farms; this is essential to an effective society. Only through our schools are we going to be able to counteract the growing conviction that large-scale farming is preferable to small farms cultivated by "free farmers" (p. 3). Anyone teaching rural sociology in urban schools is aware how difficult it is to convince students of this point (and from the criticism by O. E. Baker and others of agricultural schools, it would seem to be as difficult to convince rural students).

The condition of the rural church is well-developed in Chapter 12 but the author's attitude toward religion seems to be one of expediency. He says "The primary role that can be played by cooperating churches is to convince all men that our lives must be lived in brotherliness, and that the undramatic production or creation of good things for man's use accomplishes infinitely

more, in the long run, than the bitterness, destruction, and chaos of war." (p. 228). On the whole, however, the chapter is excellent. Attention is given to the National Catholic Rural Life Conference and its possibilities for improving rural life.

In his concluding chapter Lindstrom again stresses his major issues which are: family-sized farms, evils of large-scale operation, the land as a social trust, and the need for social security for the family. With regard to this latter point he says: "The right kind of social security program would put some kind of premium on the proper rearing of a large family" (p. 374). And "if rural people are to build up the soil, produce efficiently, rear moderately large families, provide an adequate education for them, and continue to contribute to the total culture of the society in which they live, they must be given adequate social security, against the background of a modern rural cultural environment" (p. 373).

The book is not over-burdened with material and is just about adequate for a three hour course. There are some good discussion questions at the end of each chapter which are accompanied by a reading list.

SISTER LEO MARIE, O.P.

Siena College, Memphis 5, Tenn.

RURAL LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES. By Carl C. Taylor and Associates. New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 1949. Pp. xviii + 549 + xii. \$6.75 trade; \$5.00 text.

Because this most recent of rural sociology texts is written by eight experts, all associated with the United States Department of Agriculture, and several of them college teachers in the past, it is possibly the very best in the field. The text material is closely written, but each chapter is broken up with suitable headings, and the table of contents lists 33 pictures, 63 tables, and 48 maps and charts. On the whole, the writing is clear and forthright, with definitions given as needed, and although students might prefer a greater number of paragraph headings, with easier study guides in the form of dark-face type headings, definitions in italics and other helps, they will appreciate the vast amount of facts and ideas provided in attractive form. The illustrations are especially well chosen, and the tables, maps and charts are up-to-date and effectively presented.

Every phase of rural sociology appears to be covered, in so far, but only in so far, as it refers to the United States. Starting off with a brief history of the subject, and then a brief history of the evolution of American rural society, the third chapter begins with the analysis of rural life where this should be begun: with the farm home and family, followed by chapters on rural neighborhoods and communities, trade areas, the school, the church, local government, health, welfare, recreation and art. After these there are chapters on population characteristics, occupational patterns, the landowner, tenant, and farm laborer situation, levels of living and social differentials. Then comes a section on rural culture in the major type-farming areas of the United States, seven separate chapters on the seven areas into which the authors divide the country, following by chapters which correlate the whole, making comparisons and contrasts. Finally, there is a section on farmers in a changing world, their opinions and attitudes, farmers' movements and

large farmers' organizations (so often omitted from rural texts), and significant trends of change.

The book was most probably in press when displaced persons began coming to this country, but it seems a pity that at least some mention of them was not made in the final chapter on the direction of change. No melting-pot works wholly one way, and change will occur as these people settle in our rural areas. Since many displaced persons are Catholics, this topic would have been of especial interest to Catholic sociologists. One might criticize also the bibliographies: useful though these are, they are somewhat sketchy; recent rural sociology texts are rarely referred to, and many almost necessary references are absent, — for example, the bibliography of the chapter on the "Rural Church and Religion" makes no note of the publications of the N.C.R.L.C., even though this organization is adequately and accurately portrayed in the text as to history, achievements, and position to-day (with the exception of a reference to *Land and Home*, which ceased to exist in the course of 1948, being replaced by the monthly *The Christian Farmer*). The sociology instructor might wish that there were reference to theories about rural life, and that more general terms, processes etc., were given and defined, as in Sanderson's *Rural Sociology and Rural Social Organization*, but on the other side it might be argued that such terms, and theories, should already be learned in an introductory course, or that supplementary readings will furnish what is needed.

In general, there is so much to be said in favor of this text, that it is picayune to mention minor points which any one individual might wish to have altered. Essential for the college library, the general reader will welcome the book, because it is attractively produced, written in good style, and it does give a picture of the state of rural life in the United States, with a lead to where it is tending and to its problems. Those who are opposed to all forms of socialized medicine without having formed their position on adequate facts, might do well to read the chapter on rural health and then to think carefully over the situation before coming to a final opinion.

EVA J. ROSS

Trinity College, Washington 17, D. C.

**PLOWSHARES INTO SWORDS: AGRICULTURE IN THE WORLD WAR AGE.** By Arthur P. Chew. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948. Pp. xi + 221. \$3.00.

The theme of this book is given in the title to chapter one: "Modern War Is for Farms." According to Mr. Chew modern industrial nations are driven to war to insure a safe and permanent food supply. If nations enter upon a struggle for coal, iron, oil, or raw materials, this is just a roundabout way of getting their hands on agricultural products. "In short, the industrial world makes war for agricultural reasons." (p. 7).

In the early stages of industrialization everything goes well. Population may increase for a time, but production increases at a faster rate and the standard of living rises. If the nation is one endowed with limited agricultural resources, it may rely upon exchanging surplus manufactures for imports of food. Eventually the rate of population growth slows down, while industrial output continues to increase, and things look rosier than

ever. But the honeymoon cannot last, because backward nations eventually begin to industrialize (the FAO is urging them to do that now), and produce at home the manufactured goods previously imported from the older industrial nations. The latter lose their source of food and raw materials, because they cannot acquire the foreign exchange with which to buy them, and the only course is to go after them with tanks and bayonets.

Mr. Chew holds that this agricultural theory of war is a vindication of Malthus and a modern version of the Malthusian tenet that population always tends to press upon resources. Even the plight of industrial countries on the verge of population decline is explainable in these terms. Jealous of their standard of living, people in industrial countries restrict births and limit the size of families; but that merely means a shortage of labor to man the export industries, as in France and England today.

Despite its reliance upon Malthus, this is not a universal theory of war applicable to all times and all peoples. Mr. Chew rejects theories which apply indifferently to all wars ancient and modern, and says that the agricultural theory "offers an interpretation based on specific modern developments, notably the power of industry to burst all bounds." (p. 16). It is hard to tell whether he considers it a genuine, airtight theory of war or not. Throughout most of the book, the reader gets the impression that this is the one inescapable cause of modern wars, and that they will continue as long as we fail to match factories and farms across frontiers. But he is hard put to explain the present cold war with Russia as a quarrel about farms, and on page 21 he admits that there may be other causes for war.

It is possible that a plausible explanation of the course of industrialization and the wars of the past few decades (Germany's part in World War II is a perfect demonstration of the agricultural theory of war" (p. 18), can be developed along these lines; but there is no necessary and inherent reason why industrialization must lead to a struggle for farms. If it has done so in the past, it is a result of the blindness of political leaders, greed of special interests, and man-made obstacles to the free flow of trade. And there is just as much hope that statesmen will eventually see the light — that nations will cooperate in receiving imports which raise their standard of living and permit them to export their surpluses — as there is for Mr. Chew's vague plan to slow the industrialization of agricultural countries.

This book is an illustration of the danger of thinking in aggregates. Mr. Chew constantly contrasts manufactured products with food products, and time and again makes statements such as the following: "The only permanent foundation of international trade is the necessity to exchange nonedibles for edibles," (page 105) and "more factories in some countries mean fewer factories in others." (page 82). But there is no intrinsic reason why there cannot be as much exchange of different kinds of industrial products for agriculture commodities. If we can eliminate restrictions to trade and check depressions before they reach the proportions of the 1930's, there is no reason why the rise of factories in Australia, for instance, must mean cutting back in Great Britain — provided the former continues to raise a surplus of food, as Mr. Chew presupposes. Even if Australia builds factories, it can raise its standard of living still further by exchanging its agricultural surplus for more of the industrial products it already produces and for many others it cannot produce because it, along with most other countries south of

the equator, has no coal and iron. All that is required is understanding on the part of the people and intelligence and goodwill on the part of the statesmen.

MARTIN E. SCHIRBER, O.S.B.

St. John's University, Collegeville, Minn.

**SOCIAL WORK. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FIELD.** By Herbert Hewitt Stroup. New York: American Book Co., 1948. Pp. xvi + 695. \$4.50.

The number of books appearing that define social work and describe its functions is increasing rapidly. This is an obvious indication of the growing interest in social work and the desire of students to know more about the profession. Mr. Stroup has attempted to discuss not only the nature and scope of social work but to give a short history of social work in this country. Furthermore, he presents the specific fields of family casework, child welfare, medical social work, psychiatric social work, social group work, and community organization. He describes the development of school social work and the nature and functions of public welfare. The only omission that can be noted is that of research in social work. But the comprehensiveness of Stroup's *Introduction to the Field* makes it, in my opinion, the best that has appeared to date. It will, therefore, serve as a good text for students in undergraduate colleges and also for those entering graduate schools with little pre-professional understanding of social work.

The chapters that concern the various functional fields, as family casework and child welfare, are brightened by the presentation of case studies. Some may object to this, however, since it may leave the student with an inadequate idea of the long processes involved in working with people in trouble. But the use of case studies seems to be the best method of arousing interest in students for the profession of social work. It likewise avoids the hazards that come with field work in the undergraduate colleges. It is sufficient for the undergraduate to get a general knowledge of the field and its purposes. Casework methods can be taught more adequately in the professional graduate schools where the student is receiving field work experience concurrently with classes.

The Catholic student and instructor will miss all reference to motivation and character formation in Stroup's text. They will find no comment on the natural and divine law that governs free creatures and that would serve admirably as criteria of guidance and action for the social worker in his relationship with clients. The book is a description of what social workers are doing rather than of what they should be doing for their clients. To that extent, social work itself is a failure. For the whims and wishes of people are an indication of their problems, but the solution of these problems must be in conformity with the order established by nature and Almighty God. Right reason and the law of God are the norms or criteria of wholesome and purposeful living.

A good bibliography is given at the end of each chapter and additional bibliographies of books and periodical literature are in the appendix.

A. H. SCHELLER, S. J.

St. Louis University, St. Louis 3, Mo.

**VOLUNTARY MEDICAL CARE INSURANCE In The UNITED STATES.**  
by Franz Goldmann. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. Pp. xi + 228. \$3.00.

This compact book is a succinct account of the principals of medical care insurance; its development in the United States and the national voluntary programs. Dr. Goldman provides an evaluation of cash indemnity plans; the non-profit hospital and physicians' service plans, Blue Cross and Blue Shield; non-profit plans covering professional and hospital services; individual practice plans and group practice plans. In conclusion the author reviews the limitations and potentialities of voluntary plans. Extensive bibliographical notes and an index are additional proof of his careful scholarship.

Throughout the work from the initial quotation on illness taken from Gautama Siddhartha to the final challenge to unify and improve group prepayment and group practice, Dr. Goldman indicates the social and economic costs of illness. The modern device of insurance to pay for preventive services and for treatment is a highly desirable one for millions of our people. But there must also be assurance of adequate care. Since the organization in 1851 of a French society in San Francisco to the present, there has been a growing recognition and expansion of medical care insurance. Sponsored alike by industrialists, businessmen, union leaders and farmers the program of such insurance has adopted numerous plans of the profit and non-profit types. Medical, dental and hospital associations have facilitated treatment of patients who carry such insurance. Today, however, there is need for more unity and equalization in the field of medical care insurance and for more medical centers and an extension of care to rural areas. Such improvements are essential for the well-being of our people.

The layman is indebted to Dr. Goldmann for his useful history and analysis of medical care insurance.

MARGARET MARY TOOLE

College of Notre Dame of Maryland, Baltimore 10, Maryland

**THE POLITICAL TRADITION OF THE WEST. A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN LIBERALISM.** By Frederick Watkins. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948. Pp xiv + 368. \$5.00.

The contemporary threat of totalitarianism to liberal political institutions is provoking inquiries into the history, strength and weakness, and possible improvement of liberalism. *The Political Tradition of the West*, whose author is professor of political science at McGill University, pursues the history of political liberalism from the Greeks up to the present day, with due attention to the religious, social and economic influences that have shaped its character. The essential element of liberalism is seen in the concept of freedom under law, which subordinates public officials to the ethical and legal prescriptions of independently organized agencies of public opinion. In the East there have been societies in which social order was maintained by ethical rather than by legal means. Western civilization, by contrast, since the time of the ancient Greeks has relied on the enactment of legal rules to reduce the citizen's dependence on discretionary authority to a minimum, thus making life more secure and calculable.

The totalitarianism which today seriously threatens the liberal tradition is often misconceived as something entirely alien to western civilization because of its departure from the traditions of legalism and pluralism. In one of the most interesting chapters of his book, Professor Watkins traces the development of the theory and practice of modern totalitarianism, surprisingly enough, to the exponents of modern liberalism themselves (p. 304 ff.). He considers one of the most important historical factors preparing the way for modern dictatorial regimes to be the theory and practice adopted by modern states in the government of colonial empires whose populations were believed to be inferior, incapable of self-government, and necessarily subject to the discretionary rule of an enlightened minority. Racist colonialism, the secularized version of the Calvinist doctrine of grace by special election, remains one of the unsolved problems of modern liberalism. Another is that of nationalism and unlimited national sovereignty which still hinder development of an effective international community. A third weakness of liberalism lies in its insufficient recognition of the nature and function of the organized group life of various associations situated in the area between the individual and the state. These weaknesses in the liberal heritage must be overcome if liberalism is to compete successfully against totalitarianism which is exercising a powerful attraction upon large masses of the world's population today.

Speaking of the future of liberalism, the author expresses doubt that there is any prospect, within the foreseeable future, of re-uniting the western world (and even less that majority of mankind where non-Christian religions prevail) on the basis of the Christian religion. The lack of religious unity is too great, and the deterioration of religious faith has gone too far for that. He believes the example of ancient China, which achieved a long period of social stability with the aid of the secular humanism of Confucius after the decay of religion had resulted in an age of anarchy and dictatorship, is warrant for the hope that a secular ethics can provide a basis for the preservation of western civilization. At this point, however, some readers will ask the question whether the crucial issue is not between a theistic humanism characterized by a respect for the natural moral law as an expression of a reality superior to man, and a purely this-worldly humanism which ignores God. Even Confucius, agnostic though he may have been, inculcated the practice of the traditional religion of China as one of the necessary factors of social control and order. The words of Swinburne ("glory to man in the highest, for man is the master of things") ring hollow today in a world that has been trying for several generations to its own bitter cost to leave God out of account. The author himself seems to recognize that perhaps secular humanism may not be enough to save our civilization when he says: "If secularization is incompatible with the maintenance of political and social ethics, it follows that the future of the world must lie in the hands of the ethically uninhibited exponents of totalitarian government rather than with the more conservative supporters of modern liberalism" (p. 343).

ERNEST KILZER, O. S. B.

St. John's University, Collegeville, Minn.

EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES: A SURVEY OF 20th CENTURY POLITICAL IDEAS. Edited by Felix Gross, with an introduction by Robert M. MacIver. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948. Pp. xv + 1075. \$12.00.

The college sociologist is naturally interested in a volume on "-isms"; for he is frequently called upon to teach a course known as History of Social Thought or by a corresponding phrase which can barely conceal the fact that its subject matter is practically identical with similar courses taught in other social science departments.

Both title and arrangement as well as the publishers of the present volume will at once bring to the mind of a sociologist its excellent companion on Twentieth Century Sociology. Unfortunately the comparison works to the former's disadvantage. The most conspicuous characteristic which both books have in common consists in the countless printing errors and general lack of technical care which obviously is the fault less of the scholarly editors who are not the same in both cases than of the identical publishing house.

A much more serious criticism of Goss' edition refers to the method of analysis and presentation, which all too often falls short of that standard of rationality and objectivity that after all has become generally accepted as "scientific." Roughly half of the 27 chapters reflect only too unmistakably the personal positions (either violently contra, or insistently pro) of individual authors who have some axe to grind (though admittedly not the same axe) and who are trying to persuade rather than describe, to analyse, and to demonstrate the logical implications and empirical consequences of the ideologies under consideration. Many of these essays are written with blood and tears; they are the kind of political literature one would expect to find in the *New Republic*-type of magazine. Now there is of course nothing wrong with political journalism but it cannot possibly serve as a basis for academic instruction.

Nevertheless the volume does not lack consistency as the list of contributors will reveal, most of whom are themselves well-known exponents of the one or other "-ism." To label them would appear neither fair nor easy particularly in view of the semantic differences in the use of such terms as "Liberalism" and "democratic socialism" by Continental and Anglo-Saxon or American authors. In reading the first nine chapters devoted to the various nuances of liberalism and leftist radicalism, one cannot help feeling that they are largely concerned with the domestic affairs and quarrels of ex-marxists and reformed fellow-travellers. One of the most impressive and at the sametime most controversial pieces in this section, Rubin Gotesky's "Liberalism in Crisis," appears as the work of a disillusioned radical relying on Marxist arguments with a Spenglerian undertow.

Being more in the nature of a profession of faith than of a scholarly discussion (see "The Epilogue"), the book probably was to win rather than to lose from a selection of contributors which favored formed active participants in the ideological and political struggles referred to. Their distribution is thus heavily weighted in the direction of those men who were the losers on the European political scene between the two wars. Authors with connections to countries now beyond the Iron Curtain seem to outnumber all the others. Thus the role of Western Europe is partly neglected, with England's leading political analysts including Professor Laski not even men-

tioned. On the other hand, this slant has its advantage in that much valuable information is brought to light which is usually inaccessible to American students. In this connection may be mentioned the chapters on Russia's Herzen by Tartak, on Agrarianism by G. M. Dimitrov, on the Russian peasant Movement by Zenzinov, on Communism by Nomad, on Reionalism and Separatism by the better known American J. S. Roucek, and on Panslavism by Wacław Lednicki, the latter a learned and interesting monograph, though expressed with a certain "Polish accent."

Other parts of the volume dealing with the opposing schools of thought such as different brands of nationalism (apart from the article on Panslavism and a good though not too original introduction to the section by T. V. Kalijarvi) and of anti-liberal and anti-socialist doctrines suffer largely from a lack of sympathetic understanding which however is only too understandable. Yet sociologists have long recognized that moral indignation is not the proper approach in scientific study of social problems; for each cultural system, even that of the criminalgang, has to be interpreted first on the basis of its own premises and inner logic. While the reasons for the inadequacy of both chapters on the Jewish problem by Letschinski are not so obvious, it is of course too much to ask from such a prominent opponent of PanGermanism as F. W. Foserter to follow the rules of disinterested participant observation. Although his essay contains many flashes of genuine insight, for instance as to the roll of the professorial leaders of PanGermanism, he himself at times seem to assume the attitude of a "Treitschke of Anti-PanGermanism." One of the most pleasing exceptions to this widely moralizing and unscientific mode of discussion concerning everything that does not fall strictly within the scope of the leitmotif of this volume is Alfredo Mendizabal's scholarly and well annotated article on "Catholicism and Politics." His general theme of the Church's attitude toward liberalism, and the clear distinction he makes between a Catholic party and a party of Catholics will be read with respectful attention by American Catholics even by those who may disagree with his political convictions.

In conclusion it may be repeated that despite the stimulating reading it affords, much valuable information it presents, and several excellent essays it includes, the present volume does not seem to fulfill its promise and ultimate purpose. This is not entirely the fault of its editors and contributors. The position of political theory as a systematic theory of politics seems still more precarious than that of sociological theory. There is not only in both disciplines a lack of a unifying system, but political science perhaps more than sociology fails to provide a rigorous conceptual framework which would allow the comparison of different ideological systems beyond animated polemics as to their relative merits. It may well be that sociology of knowledge could help to clarify the meaning and nature of political ideologies.

E. K. FRANCIS

University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.

CHAPTERS IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION. Selected and Edited by the Contemporary Civilization Staff of Columbia College, Columbia University. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. Two volumes, pp. vii + 437 and viii + 299. \$2.50 each.

These two volumes of reading are meant to replace the mimeoprinted *Manuals*, which accompanied the two volume source book, *Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West* (reviewed here in October 1946 and March 1947). Of the total of twenty chapters, ten are drawn from other books, ten were specially written for these volumes or for use in the Contemporary Civilization course of Columbia College, and provide orientation and interpretation for the source book materials.

Volume one has chapters dealing with western civilization in its religious, political, economic, scientific and cultural aspects from the middle ages to the French Revolution. The chapters of volume two cover the period from the age of Romanticism to the time between the World Wars.

There are interpretations here and there with which not all readers will agree. In the second chapter on The Medieval Heritage (vol. I), the Church during the Apostolic period extending to about 100 A.D. is said to have possessed "no true clergy differentiated from the rest of the members of the small Christian communities" (p. 74). The impression is given that "a system of sacraments" grew up only between the end of the Apostolic period and the middle ages (pp. 75 and 91). St. Augustine is interpreted as teaching "that man's free will was restricted upon his fall and that he could gain it back only through Christ's sacrifice and the compelling grace of God" (p. 79). "Vows of humility, chastity and poverty" seems to be a slip of the pen for "vows of obedience, chastity and poverty" (p. 82). In Chapter VI of volume one on the Reformation by H. E. Barnes and M. B. Garrett, the Council of Trent is said to have "declared the Vulgate inspired" (p. 232). The Council's declaration that the Vulgate is to be considered as *authentic* is not equivalent to saying it is "inspired." St. Ignatius Loyola's "religious experience" is equated with Luther's and his visions presented as self-induced by "rigorous asceticism" (p. 236 f.).

Such occasional slips do not however detract greatly from the value of these volumes. Sociologists will be interested in the chapters devoted to the Enlightenment, the Romantic Protest, the Industrialization of Society, the Impact of Darwinism, Social Viewpoints Since 1850, and Europe between World Wars. It is interesting to see that the evaluation of science during the middle ages and in the Renaissance given in these volumes is much more balanced than that which had been current a few decades ago before the results of Pierre Duhem's pioneer work in this field became better known in this country. The achievements of Galileo, for example, are seen no longer as a sort of creation out of nothing, but as the continuation of speculations current among Arabian and other later medieval thinkers.

ERNEST KILZER, O.S.B.

St. John's University, Collegeville, Minn.

PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY. By Tom C. Clark and Philip B. Perlman. Washington 8, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1948. Pp. 104. \$2.00 cloth, \$1.00 paper.

Restrictive racial covenants resulted from the unconstitutionality of state and city attempts to confine minority groups within certain areas by force of law. The end product of the covenants has been inferior housing, unhealthy living conditions, dense concentrations of minority peoples and embarrassment for U. S. State Department in international relations. The authors of this brief addressed to the U. S. Supreme Court do not believe that prejudice can be eliminated by force of law. They do however state that it is not the function of a democratic government to give the support of law to such covenants.

The authors cite liberally from sociological literature, such as Myrdahl's "American dilemma," Johnson's "Patterns of Negro Segregation" and other works to prove their points. The entire history of the origin and development of the restrictive racial covenant is set forth briefly. While this is really a legal brief and by necessity employs some legal phraseology, it is still a very readable and illuminating document. Wesley McCune has stated in his introduction to the pamphlet, "— the law has been burdened with such a welter of esoteric jargon and procedural hocus-pocus that it has become far removed from the realities of life as the average person knows them." (p. 5). This document does make the law on racial covenants understandable to the layman. Catholics will not endorse so freely McCune's analogy between the law and the Bible in which he supports individual interpretation of the latter.

Clark and Perlman have indicated the long range results of the restrictive covenant. Perhaps some student of social change will concern himself with the results of the court's decision not to support such covenants legally in the future. Here is a provocative field for authorities in race relations. Will this change mean better homes for our minorities, less prejudice toward them or will some other device be discovered to perpetuate segregation under a different name? The decision of the court could scarcely have been otherwise in view of the excellent arguments expounded in this document. Will it effectively diminish the cultural lag between the ideals of democracy and the actual practices in a democratic country toward racial and ethnic minorities? Another question sociologist might ask is whether in this case our legal institutions are running ahead of our mores.

JOHN J. KANE

University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.

## SHORT NOTICES

**INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY.** Third Edition. By R. L. Sutherland and J. L. Woodward, Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Co., Pp. xiv + 882. \$5.00.

Although this deservedly popular introductory text has been entirely reset for more effective presentation of the subject matter, with many picture replacements, the authors themselves say that very little has been done to re-write the text except to bring eight year old bibliographies up-to-date, and to modernize certain statistics. On the whole the authors have succeeded in this modernization of statistics and bibliographies. They have done more, for many paragraphs, and several pages in succession here and there throughout the book have been re-written, notably Chapter One which is much improved and includes a useful page on careers for sociologists. Our Catholic College libraries will need this new edition for student reference.

**AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY.** Third Edition. By C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys. New York: The Ronald Press, 1948. Pp. ix + 764. \$5.00.

This third edition is an entirely new book, even though there are many paragraphs which can be found in the last edition (1935), the authors' general interests in ecology and in processes are still evident, their method of presenting information through the citation of cases is there too, and they have left the final two chapters on the history and method of sociology almost entirely unchanged. Footnote references often still confine themselves to citations of books published up to 1934, but the very complete bibliographies given at the end of each chapter have been entirely revised. This text is not quite so comprehensive as to topics as some of the other popular general sociology texts, but Dawson and Gettys make a much greater use of history than do the others, and imagination is shown in new-type cases and examples. No well-equipped college library ought to be without a copy of this new edition.

**FORTY YEARS AFTER: POPE PIUS AND THE SOCIAL ORDER.** By Rev. Raymond J. Miller, C.Ss.R. St. Paul, Minn.: Fathers Rumble and Carty Radio Replies Press, 1948. Pp. vii + 332. \$2.75 paper; \$3.75 cloth.

Father Miller takes the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* paragraph by paragraph, adding a commentary to the variant interpretations, past events which led to the Pope's statements, the history and position of the Church on the social question in the United States and many other countries.

The work is so prodigious that it may seem captious to find fault with it. Nevertheless the informed reader will wish that Father Miller could have seen his work more in perspective. Had he done so, the book would have been pruned to allow of easier comprehension by the uninitiated. While he is up-to-date to 1947 in many respects, Father Miller is not always fully informed of current situations. One reads for example, that "Great Britain and the United States" are lagging in the provision of family allowances (p. 71), hardly true of Great Britain now; up-to-date information is also lacking on meetings of Catholic employers in Great Britain, and on the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions. One would hope that in the next edition Father Miller could give the date of publication of the books and

pamphlets cited, omitting many ephemeral publications and adding more current books. Belloc's *Servile State* is somewhat unaccountably omitted from the Distributist books cited (p. 245); Father Lewis Watt's excellent studies on property and the social encyclicals are unfortunately not noted; and the stewardship aspect of property ownership does not seem to be adequately developed. Despite these few criticisms, Father Miller's encyclopedic work will definitely have its valued place in the personal libraries of students of social philosophy and labor economics, as well as in our colleges and schools. All public libraries should be urged to secure a copy for their reference shelves.

**COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS.** By William N. Loucks and J. Weldon Hoot. Third Edition. New York: Harper & Bros., 1948. Pp. xv + 836.

This new edition of a deservedly popular text will probably lead to an increased number of college adoptions. A chapter on "Economic Institutions and Economic Change" has been added to the beginning of the text; the section on Fascism in Italy and Germany has been sensibly shortened and rewritten; a section of three chapters has been added, on socialization in Great Britain. Apart from modernization of statistics and more up-to-date bibliographies, the balance of the book remains largely as before.

Certain other changes might seem to be indicated: the chapters on the Utopias and St. Thomas More appear to be unnecessary relics of the longer section of Utopias in the first edition, whereas chapters on the various types of socialism, and an analysis of ideas on property ownership from the middle ages to the present time would give a better all-round understanding of the development of both socialism and capitalism. Those interested in cooperation will be as dissatisfied as before with the two chapters covering consumers' cooperation only; and those interested in decentralization would assuredly welcome a chapter or two on the history of Distributism and decentralization theories.

The Catholic, with his rather precise notions of the meaning of socialism, will dislike seeing the current British system referred to as "British socialism" in the Foreword (p. xv) and on (p. 345). Yet the headings of the pages in this section devoted to the British organization correctly call it "British socialization." So long as an attempt is made to give just compensation for industries nationalized in Great Britain, socialism in the Catholic sense is not, of course, present. What is currently being accomplished is not contrary to the teachings of Christian social philosophy; the real issue is whether it is really as necessary as the present government claims, or whether the criticisms of the Conservative Party members and others not in favor of the Labor government's policies are valid.

**LIVING IN THE SOCIAL WORLD,** revised. By J. A. Quinn and A. Repke. Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1948. Pp. vii + 536. \$2.60.

The few statistics in this book are now up-to-date, and the content and make-up of this most attractively written and produced high-school text is even better than before. With the exception of a not quite accurate account of church views on science (pp. 482-483), the text seems to be singularly free of statements which are against our principles. On the other hand, there

is absolutely no integration of Christian social principles with the subject matter — a need, on the high-school level at least, which seems to make the class use of a specifically Catholic text imperative. The book will, however, be most useful to Catholic high-school teachers of sociology who are looking for supplementary teaching material, or who see the value of suitable library references for students which will give them new viewpoints, added interest, or additional information.

**YOU AND YOUR FAMILY.** By B. M. Moore and D. M. Leahy. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1948. Pp. vii + 440. \$2.60.

Two-thirds of this interesting and well-produced high-school text for home economics students is devoted to the development of "personality," and the balance is on general family life. Unfortunately, the authors' behavior-philosophy is evident in chapter one, and inherited psychological and temperamental difference between the sexes is somewhat under-estimated, so that the teacher who might use the book as a text would probably begin with a criticism of the authors — hardly a good pedagogical approach. The part played by the faculties of intellect and will in the development of personality, and the important work of grace through the Sacraments and other channels are obviously missing. If this neglect is taken into account, the book ought to prove very useful for class reference or supplementary reading material on social psychology, mental hygiene, and general social etiquette. Father Schmiedeler's high-school "Marriage and the Family" text is noted on the general bibliographies of appropriate chapters. Some very good reasons on the general social level are given for sensible, courteous, and thoughtful behavior in various social situations.

**THE THEORY OF WAGES.** By J. R. Hicks. New York: Peter Smith, 1948. Pp. xiv + 247. \$4.00.

Catholics interested in the Church's social philosophy on economic organization have long been aware that this can be actuated only if their proposals for change are realistic, based upon an understanding of the economic principles behind capitalistic organization. Since the payment of a living wage is of immediate concern to Catholic moralists, this reprint of a well-known book will bring them nearer to an understanding of some of the issues which are possibly involved. Both before and after reading the book, those who approach it for the first time will probably find it more valuable if they refer to some of the many reviews of it which appeared at the time of first publication by Macmillan in 1932.

## PERIODICAL REVIEWS

C. J. NUESSE, Editor  
The Catholic University of America  
Washington 17, D. C.

### Recent Articles with Special Pertinence for Catholic Sociologists

Clement, Marcel, "Promotion des sciences sociales," *La vie intellectuelle*, 16 (11): 65-73. November, 1948.

This is a statement of the aims of the Faculty of Social Sciences of Laval University, which, it is held, utilizes the American formula of scientific specialization and the Marxist formula of social and economic "education," combining and integrating the contributions of each in a synthesis of Catholic inspiration and French expression. American sociological development is characterized as stressing specialization and technical facility, confusing liberal beliefs with scientific laws, and believing naively that social science will eventually solve the major problems of society.

Dunn, Edward S., S. J., "Mixed Marriages in 1947," *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, 120 (1): 33-42. January, 1949.

Mihanovich, Clement S., "Catholic Population Trends in America," *Ibid.*, 119 (1): 12-18. July, 1948.

"The Vanishing Irish," *America*, 79 (19): 427-29. August 14, 1948.

Dr. Mihanovich has made out a good case to show that the Irish are really vanishing, at least at a rate that may soon portend race suicide. It is not necessarily a question of birth control but of non-marriage and late marriage. Whereas 30 per

cent of the U.S. population of 15-44 years of age was single in 1930, 65 per cent of Ireland's population in this bracket was single in 1936. Data for the article were provided by Monsignor Cornelius Lucey of St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, and seem reliable. The same generalizations probably apply to the Irish-Americans in the large metropolitan areas of the United States where they abound.

The reviewer is in a better position to evaluate the data dealing with the United States. Using the *Official Catholic Directory* for 1947, Dr. Mihanovich attempts to provide some idea of the composition of the Catholic population. Statistical tables give death rates, birth rates, and per cent of mixed marriages for 1946 computed by dioceses and by religions. It is maintained that both the Catholic birth and death rates are higher than the rates for the nation.

One must have great respect for anyone who plumbs the depths of Catholic population statistics in their present state. On the other hand, the method and conclusions of Dr. Mihanovich cannot go unchallenged. The author concedes that *Catholic Directory* statistics are not necessarily complete or accurate, but assumes that they have some use. Four years ago the reviewer, with the late Father Thomas Coogan, made a similar as-

sumption ("What is Our Real Catholic Population?" *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, 110: 368-77, May, 1944), but he no longer believes that this assumption is valid. To compute Catholic birth or death rates two things must be known: the number of Catholics and the number of Catholic births (or deaths) in a given year. My own parish reports approximately 3,500 Catholics within its confines, which is a mere guess, based in part upon the average attendance at Sunday Mass. It does not include the peak Sundays, when nearly 5,000 attend, nor the multitudes of Catholics who attend Mass irregularly, if at all. This inaccurate reporting of parish totals makes the diocesan totals unreliable. Rates cannot be computed.

Furthermore, birth rates given in the article are based on the assumption that baptisms in any year represent Catholic births in that year. This is a hazardous assumption, to say the least. For the year 1947 there were 295 baptisms in my parish. Even if we presume that pastors are careful in adding up the number of convert baptisms (17 in this case), there is still another problem. Of the remaining 278 baptisms, 24 involved children born from one to ten years before being presented for baptism. Hence, in this parish there were only 254 Catholic births (registered) in 1947, which would give us a crude birth rate of 35.8 (on the basis of 3,500 population), certainly high for New York.

Another factor: a great many of the infants presented for baptism are born of parents not known to the parish, though living within it. If their children are added to the infant total, the adults attached to the parish only geographically must also be added to the total number of Catholics. Either way, by subtracting the infants

of non-registered parents or by adding the parents to the total, the birth rate would go down. On a diocesan level, such subtractions and additions would completely invalidate computations based on the *Catholic Directory*. Father Coogan's *Catholic Fertility in Florida* (Washington: the Catholic University of America Press, 1946) is the only Catholic fertility study based upon actual census of a segment of the Catholic population.

What has been said about the computation of birth rates applies also to the Catholic death rate. The *Directory* reports the deaths only of those who received a Christian burial or were buried in Catholic cemeteries. But countless Catholics are buried without a Mass, or die unknown, or are buried in non-Catholic cemeteries or on days when Mass is not possible, etc.

Regarding mixed marriages and their relation to Catholic marriages, a number of items have been overlooked. My own study, *Catholics and the Practice of the Faith* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1946), shows that the peculiar aspect of mixed marriages is that a greater proportion of them occur outside the Church, and are thus invalid, than in the case of Catholic marriages. If this is generally true, then the student cannot rely on the *Directory* for this data; he must go out and discover the facts for himself. Dr. Mihanovich points out that in 1946, in the diocese of St. Augustine, 53 per cent of the marriages were mixed. My 1944 figure was less than 35 per cent. The newer figure may indicate a growth of mixed marriages, but for the present the 1944 figure seems more accurate, since it was arrived at through actual field research, and since invalid as well as valid mixed marriages were included.

Father Dunn has likewise based his article on statistics of marriages performed "by the priest" and reported in the *Directory*. He first corrects Dr. Mihanovich's method of computing regional and national averages and reduces the proportion of valid mixed marriages to total valid marriages from the figure of 40.2 per cent for 1946, with 26 per cent for 1947. The mixed-marriage picture is found to be "static" when the individual diocesan statistics are compared for the two years. Though the unreliability of *Directory* statistics and the unavailability of current census data are admitted, the per cent of valid mixed marriages in each diocese and the total 1940 population of each diocese are presented in parallel columns, to support the assertion that "it is more or less true that the higher the proportion of Catholics in a diocese the lower its rate of mixed marriages" (pp. 38-39).

The authors are to be complimented for the considerable work they have put into these articles. The dangers that lie in accepting conclusions based on what appears in the *Catholic Directory* must be pointed up, however. (George A. Kelly, *St. Monica's Rectory*, New York 21, N. Y.)

Le Bras, Gabriel, "Commentaire sociologique des cartes religieuse de la France," *Lumen Vitae*, 3 (4): 633-44. October-December, 1948.

A map accompanying this article, prepared by Canon Boulard, shows regional differentials in religious observance (specifically, Easter communions) in rural France. In the central and mediterranean areas the practice of the faith is seasonal and the recruitment of priests is almost hopeless. Laxity in observance, which preceded the decline in the seminaries, is traceable to local traditions probably related to certain natural

conditions of the regions, the historic scandals associated with the decline of the great abbeys, the characteristic weakness of family and social ties, the hostility of the state, and accessibility to industrializing and secularizing influences. Regular observance characterizes areas relatively protected from the centers of modern civilization by distance and geographic factors. In these there seem to be certain natural factors working to conserve religion, the family is strong though undermined, social hierarchies preserve Christian traditions, successful resistance to historic religious and social upheavals is remembered. As a result, seminaries and religious houses are full, charitable works flourish, and Christian education and militant action foster solidarity. Proposals are made for extending the technique of the study to other categories of observance, and for parallel research differentiating the sexes, social classes, occupational categories, etc.

Mihanovich, Clement S., "Religious Folklore of the Poljica Region of Dalmatia," *The Journal of American Folklore*, 61 (3): 261-82. July-September, 1948.

This is a detailed cataloguing of the religious customs of the area indicated in the title, based upon interviews with Dalmatian immigrants to the United States, correspondence with a Poljican priest, and a visit to the area. The material is arranged chronologically according to the feasts of the Church. A key to pronunciations and a glossary are appended.

O'Donnell, Hugh F., C.M., "Leadership and Catholic College Graduates," *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, 119 (6): 414-23. December, 1948.

Are Catholic-college graduates leaders? Questionnaires were sent to

every parish in two states (New York and Connecticut), with a response from 18 per cent, accounting for 10,000 graduates of Catholic colleges.

Reports from 97 parishes expressed dissatisfaction with the part played by these graduates in parish life. In 25 parishes the graduates formed a majority of parish leaders; in 59 parishes they formed a minority; in 172 parishes they formed only a negligible proportion. The good example of frequent communion was not considered satisfactory evidence of leadership by 144 pastors.

Pastors assigned various reasons for the alleged lack of leadership. Some held that college graduates were not interested, others that they had not been trained sufficiently, others that non-participation was due to lack of time. A few maintained that young college-graduate leaders were resented by the older members of parish societies, and some thought that the societies did not use means which would be attractive to college people.

A large group suggested that colleges should have societies corresponding to those found in parishes; some thought that the colleges should provide a formal course in the conduct of these societies; others proposed that pastors should urge the participation of the graduates more insistently. In general, the pastors were firmly convinced that college students should get, while in school, a thorough grounding in their responsibility as "lay-apostles." They thought that a meeting of the pastor with the students once or twice a year would help to foster real interest in parish life after graduation. As the author notes, "No *de fide* conclusions can be drawn from the statistics herein contained. Trends are indicated; the material for the formation of probable opinions of some real

value is here" (p. 423). (Philip Roets, C.Ss.R., *Holy Redeemer College, Washington 17, D.C.*

Ryan, Alvan S., "Catholic Social Thought and the Great Victorians," *Thought*, 23 (91): 641-56. December, 1948.

The discussion of Catholic social thought in England during the nineteenth century falls conveniently into three periods. During the first, extending from the Emancipation Act of 1829 to the restoration of the hierarchy in 1850, English Catholics were not in a position to provide the moral leadership necessary to meet the great social problems which beset England and the Continent. Several historical factors converged to produce a "siege mentality" among Catholics, and this attitude was not conducive to participation in constructive social reform. Bishop William Ullathorne of Birmingham, who played an important role in changing England's penal system, was the most illustrious Catholic social reformer of the period. Strangely enough, the Catholic point of view was most eloquently presented by a bitter anti-Catholic, Thomas Carlyle, who pleaded for a return to the Christian morality, inspiration, and corporate life of the Middle Ages.

The second period, from 1850 to the death of Cardinal Wiseman in 1865, began auspiciously with the Cardinal's "Appeal to the English People," in which he stressed the Church's concern over the disease, criminality, and poor living conditions of the urban masses. During his fifteen years as Archbishop of Westminster, however, Wiseman had to be content with alleviating the most pressing social needs through charitable works. No serious attempt was made to eliminate the causes of these evils. The period's ablest exponent of the Catholic social tradi-

tion was John Ruskin, who graduated from art criticism to criticism of capitalistic society, and, like Carlyle, believed that social salvation was dependent upon a return to the spirit and institutions of the Middle Ages.

Catholics in England were somewhat less on the defensive than previously during the third period, which comprised the years between 1865 and the death of Cardinal Manning 1892. The voice of Wiseman's successor was frequently raised in behalf of the worker's right to unionize and to strike, and in condemnation of starvation wages, long working hours, and woman and child labor. The Church in England had finally found a leader to expound her social doctrines in able fashion and win the respect of all classes for the institution that sponsored this teaching. (Thomas J. Harte, C.Ss.R., *The Catholic University of America*, Washington 17,

D. C.)

Van der Ploeg, J., "The Social Study of the Old Testament," *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly*, 10 (1): 72-80. January, 1948.

This is a part of an introduction to a doctoral dissertation on the sociology of Israel accepted by the Pontifical Biblical Commission in Rome. It is largely a review of the literature of sociological interpretations of the Old Testament, including those of Max Weber, Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, and others, and a plea for more thorough Catholic scholars who will "make haste slowly" in the field. Since literature is a social phenomenon, "the social study of the Bible may enable us better to understand the word of God" (p. 80). Of most worth to students of the history of social thought and of the sociology of religion.





